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Abstract 
 
 
 
 What explains the outcomes of ballot initiative contests? What factors determine 
the passage or rejection of an initiative? This paper describes and evaluates three 
approaches to explaining ballot initiative contest outcomes. The first approach involves 
using the expenditures of Yes and No campaigns as the causal factor in explaining why 
passage or defeat is the respective outcome of a given contest. The second explanatory 
approach emphasizes the logic of collective action problems. The third approach 
incorporates the larger constellation of policymaking institutions in which each ballot 
initiative process exists. Specifically, in what ways is the process shaped by the larger 
system of partisan attachments that structures electoral politics? 
 This paper contains a set of three analyses which speak to each of the three 
respective explanatory approaches to explaining initiative contest outcomes. The results 
provide evidence of the importance of a contest’s early competitive dynamic in 
determining the amount of resources made available for a campaign to spend. Left 
unaccounted for, this strategic financing of initiatives distorts estimates of the 
effectiveness of spending.  
 The second analysis, inspired by insights into collective action problems, finds the 
initiative arena to be a policymaking site where there is a competitive advantage for 
broadly diffused interests, especially when they challenge other broad interests. 
Moreover, broad-based Yes groups achieved relatively high passage rates with relatively 
low levels of campaigns expenditures. 
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 Finally, the third analysis provides evidence of a consistently high level of 
correlation between Yes voting and alignment with a particular party. The lowest levels of 
correlation were still fairly high from a measured social science perspective. In many 
instances, county-level party attachment mapped almost seamlessly over initiative 
decision making. This suggests that ballot initiatives politics do not operate outside party 
politics, as has been suggested in the past. 
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– Chapter 1 – 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 Why do some ballot initiatives pass and others fail on Election Day? What causal 
factors determine initiative contest outcomes?  
 
Introduction to the topic: Policymaking without their permission? 
 Elected representation is the primary vehicle for American democracy throughout 
all 50 statehouses and Washington D.C. Federal and state legislators and executives are 
popularly elected at regular intervals. Judges too are either elected, subject to recall, or 
appointed by one democratically elected agent with the approval of some other 
democratically elected body. Representative democracy, as Framer’s like John Madison 
envisaged it, was meant to incorporate deliberative, stabilizing, and power-sharing 
elements of statecraft. These would serve to prevent overly energetic majorities from 
doing anything too upsetting to the minorities’ preferences.  
 Emerging with Progressive and Populist movements of the early 20th century, 24 
of the United States now have an arena for citizen lawmaking called the ballot initiative 
process, a political institution where citizens can circulate petitions to place state laws 
and constitutional amendments on the ballot for a Yes or No vote. The citizens’ initiative 
is, at least on the surface level, a very different institutional actor in the process by which 
policy is made. Scholars to this day interrogate whether the ballot initiative process has 
any truly unique properties as an institution of democratic policymaking.1 How does the 
                                                           
1
 David McCuan and Steve Stambough, Initiative-Centered Politics: The New Politics of Direct 
Democracy, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2005) p. 4. 
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ballot initiative process affect the ways by which individuals and groups demand policy 
that accords with their interests and values? How does the initiative contest option alter 
the manner that policy-demanders calculate through which channel they can best control 
policy? 
 Though not a democratic panacea, theoretically a ballot initiative process can 
correct out distortions in the process by which popular opinion is translated into public 
policy in 24 states. The process of allowing average citizens to initiate an up or down 
vote on a piece of legislation has the potential to allow for policy changes which 
overcome the carefully cultivated influence of moneyed interest groups on state 
government, the insidious effects of careerism, and many more of the systemic reasons 
why elected representation falls short of meeting the policy-demands of the public.2 In 
short, the ballot initiative process appears to breach a critical membrane of the power 
wielded by elected officials, the monopoly on making changes to official policy or the 
legislative agenda. Does the initiative really wipe clean the insidious influence of 
moneyed interests and party bosses? Does the process really give outsiders an effective 
means to change policy without the permission of the big donors or the two parties?  
 A satisfying inquiry into the ballot initiative process must illuminate the 
substantive differences or pointed similarities between ballot initiatives and other modes 
of democratic lawmaking. The central question becomes, what are the mechanisms that 
determine the outcomes of ballot initiative contests? Is this process different than that 
which governs electoral politics? Then, at this point, normative questions emerge related 
                                                           
2
 Ibid, p. 5-7. 
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to how desirable one finds different determinants of success between ballot initiative 
contests and electoral politics. 
 These questions are important first because the policy stakes of initiative contests 
are high, and second because of the sheer size of initiative spending. In recent decades, 
ballot initiative contests have become one of the biggest destinations for political dollars. 
Unlike in candidate races, there are no limitations on contributions to ballot measure 
campaigns. What follows are a few facts to demonstrate the magnitude of ballot initiative 
campaign expenditures. In the 2012 general election in California, the amount of money 
spent to affect initiative contests was four times that spent to affect races for seats in the 
state legislature.3 Furthermore, the combined total of 2013 and 2012 initiative contest 
spending has been projected as a record-breaking $1.3 billion in committee 
expenditures.4  
 Explaining initiative contest outcomes has implications for policy and politics at 
the local, state, and federal level. Initiative contests outcomes not only alter the details of 
policy, they reorganize the processes by which policy is produced through changes to 
elections, constitutional provisions, and other elements of a state’s institutional 
arrangements.  
 
Analytic frame 
                                                           
3
 National Institute on Money in State Politics, “State Overview: California 2012,” Follow The Money 
database, Accessed online. 
4
 Reid Wilson, “Initiative spending booms past $1B as corporations sponsor their own proposals,” 
GovBeat, Washington Post (November 8th, 2013). Accessed online. 
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 What determines the outcomes of ballot initiative contests? This research paper 
examines the initiative process from the perspective of policy-demanding individuals and 
groups. Policy-demanders have a variety of channels to try and influence policy. Why do 
they sometimes pursue their preferred policies through the initiative process? Why do 
their efforts sometimes end in passage and sometimes end in defeat?  
 This paper will take up three different approaches to explaining how policy-
demanding individuals and groups achieve policy goals through the ballot initiative 
process.  
- Approach #1 examines explanations of passage that hinge on the effectiveness of 
campaign spending. 
- Approach #2 examines explanations of passage that focus on the relative broad 
diffusion or narrow concentration of the costs and benefits associated with a given 
initiative contest. This approach is heavily informed by the logic of collective 
action.5 
- Approach #3 follows institutionally-embedded explanations of passage. These 
explanations place policy-demanding actors into the larger institutional context of 
ballot box policymaking within a whole constellation of other institutional actors. 
 
 
Below, Table 1 compares three approaches to explanation in terms of their causal-
mechanistic structure. These three approaches will structure the experimental design and 
review of the literature that make up this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5
 This line of reasoning was influentially articulated early on by Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective 
Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,1965). 
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Agent 
 Process Outcome 
Approach 
#1 
 
Policy-demanding individuals 
and groups 
Policy-demanders use their 
financial resources Passage/Defeat 
    to change voter behavior   
Approach 
#2 
Policy-demanding individuals 
and groups 
Policy-demander exploits the 
narrowness or breadth Passage/Defeat 
    of their preferred policy   
Approach 
#3 
Policy-demanding individuals 
and groups 
Policy-demander exploits 
some feature of the Passage/Defeat 
    institutional environment   
TABLE 1: Three approaches to explaining initiative contest outcomes 
 
Contribution to the literature: 
 This thesis paper contributes to the literature on initiative contests first by 
synthesizing the various strands of literature that seek to explain passage. The review of 
the literature suggests new avenues for exploring the role of money in contest outcomes. 
This paper makes an argument for the importance of understanding the individual 
decision-making of the policy entrepreneurs who navigate the initiative arena. Yet, these 
explanations only make sense when placed inside the larger institutional context. This 
paper identifies institutionally-embedded explanations of initiative contest outcomes as 
an area of potential growth in ballot initiative scholarship. Finally, this paper provides 
guidance for enriching explanations of ballot initiative politics by expanding the 
outcome-of-interest beyond passage/failure to potential political and procedural 
objectives. 
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 This paper’s three experimental sections each provide a different contribution to 
the current body of knowledge related to the ballot initiative process. First, this author 
provides evidence of strategic financing of initiatives based on the early competitive 
dynamic. This behavior biases estimates of spending’s effectiveness if excluded from an 
explanatory model. Evidence is also provided of Yes-demanding groups achieving 
extraordinarily high passage rates without spending much money or facing much 
competition in cases where their initiative takes an early and decisive lead. This 
phenomenon also merits incorporation into the econometric models by which the 
influence of money is measured. 
 This thesis also provides evidence that the initiative process is largely an arena of 
majoritarian politics – conflicts in which both broad costs and broad benefits are at stake. 
In these predominant, majoritarian-type political situations, the passage rate is by far the 
highest. The research contained here adds to a body of findings which suggest that the 
initiative process is a site of regular victories for broad groups with limited financial 
resources. In line with earlier authors, this author observes a correlation which supports 
the premise that policy-demanders with broadly diffused interests exercise a competitive 
advantage in the initiative arena.6 
 The final section of this project provides an analysis of the initiative within the 
context of the larger institutional environment. Specifically, does the ballot initiative 
process operate independently of party politics? How much does the structure of partisan 
attachments structure the coalitions from which winning initiative efforts are built? 
                                                           
6
 E Elisabeth Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of Direct 
Legislation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) p. 65. 
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Evidence is provided of a reliable and often quite high correlation between a county’s 
party attachment and its voting in particular initiative contests. This suggests that ballot 
initiative politics takes place within the coalition-building rules of electoral politics. 
Therefore, ballot initiative passage and defeat is partly determined by the policy-
demanders ability to exploit the current configuration of partisan attachments. Evidence 
is provided that ballot initiative policymaking does not take place outside party politics, 
as has elsewhere been suggested. 
 The final section of this paper provides recommendations for future researchers 
investigating the mechanics of success in the ballot initiative process. 
 
Philosophy of social science 
 Explanations, by their definition, invoke causal stories. According to philosophy 
of social science scholar Daniel Little in his 1991 book Varieties of Social Explanation, 
explanatory reasoning invokes three central ideas: “[1)] the ideas of a causal mechanism 
connecting cause and effect, [2)] the idea of a correlation between two or more variables, 
and [3)] the idea that one event is a necessary or sufficient condition for another.”7 Little 
is certain to note that, particularly in light of unique properties of the social world, a 
model of social explanation must embrace probabilistic causal claims wherein a condition 
might not be fully necessary or sufficient to bring about an effect, but it does significantly 
change the probability of the phenomenon’s occurrence.8 
                                                           
7
 Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991) p. 4. 
8
 Ibid. 
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 Explanation is one of the two main forms of argumentation (along with 
description) that has been the territory of scientists and philosophers since ancient times. 
Explanation is at the core of all scientific inquiry – from microbiology and astrophysics 
through anthropology and political science. It is important to conduct this research with a 
thought-out and engaged philosophy of how to evaluate social scientific explanations. 
This author takes a methodological individualist stance, meaning simply that all 
explanations of social phenomena must come packaged with at least some gesture 
towards an explanatory sketch of a causal mechanism involving the goal-directed 
behavior of individual human beings. The methodologically individualistic approach this 
researcher claims is akin to that articulated by Daniel Little, who argues that the primary 
idea underneath all explanatory reasoning is “a causal mechanism connecting cause and 
effect.”9 
 So “mechanisms” are essential to explanation. Explanations must be compatible 
with our understandings of the behavior of intentional individuals. What is meant exactly 
by this term mechanism? Sociologist Arthur Stinchombe defined mechanisms as “bits of 
theory about entities at a different level (e.g. individuals) than the main entities being 
theorized about (e.g. groups), which serve to make the higher level theory more supple, 
more accurate, or more general.”10 Figure 6 displays the skeleton for the explanations the 
reader will encounter in this Literature Review and subsequent experimental design.  
 
                                                           
9
 Ibid, p. 14. 
10
 Arthur L. Stinchombe, “The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing About Mechanisms in Social 
Science,” Philosophy of Social Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Sept. 1991) p.367. 
  
FIGURE 1.1: Generic causal
 
 
 The use of these repeated explanatory schematics responds to Daniel Little’s 
challenge to social scientists published online in June of 2011: “If we assert a causal or 
explanatory relation between one social entity or condition 
prepared to offer a credible sketch 
through the mentalities and actions of individuals.”
 Figure 1.2, seen below, shows a more specific skeleton for the explanations of 
passage that will be covered in this Literature Review’s subsections for Approaches #1
Recall that we need to be explaining the mechanisms through which goal
in the initiative process achieve passage through the actions of goal
their own sets of preferences, intentions, commitments, and beliefs. 
 
                                                          
11
 Daniel Little, “Microfoundationalism,” Understanding Society, accessed online on Septe
(Published June 28, 2011). 
9 
 
-mechanistic story 
and another, we must be 
of the ways in which this influence is conveyed 
11
  
-directed voters with 
 
 
-3. 
-directed actors 
mber 2nd, 2013 
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FIGURE 1.2: Structure for this paper’s explanations of initiative contest outcomes 
 
 
 The causes we examine will relate to the intentional behavior of policy-
demanding individuals and groups pursuing their objectives through the initiative 
process. The effect is represented inside the box on the right, the one at which the arrow 
is pointed. Passage is the main dependent variable. 
 
Terminology 
 The effect is always to be defined in terms of passage or defeat, or relatedly, in 
terms of vote share. Consequently, discussions of the “effectiveness” of different causal 
variables will be referring to whether that variable has the property of influencing an 
initiatives probability of passage. Furthermore, any time ballot initiative “contest 
outcomes” are mentioned, the outcome in question is always either passage/defeat or vote 
share. Accordingly, unless otherwise stated, ballot initiative “success” shall refer to ballot 
initiative passage.  
 For analytical clarity, this thesis will use the terms Yes and No spending to 
consolidate the various terminology employed in different studies to describe spending 
directed at promoting the respective passage or defeat of an initiative. Yes spending is 
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conducted by Yes campaigns for the purpose of prompting voters to accept ballot 
initiatives. No spending is conducted by No campaigns in order to persuade voters to 
reject the initiative in question.   
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– Chapter 2 – 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 What causes initiatives to pass? This literature review is structured around three 
approaches to explaining initiative contest outcomes. The first approach (#1) investigates 
the influence of campaign money in affecting initiative contest outcomes. Explanations 
here will focus on the financial resources of Yes and No campaigns as potential factors 
affecting passage. Approach #2 looks to the breadth or concentration of a proposed 
initiative’s costs and benefits to explain the mechanisms governing passage and rejection.  
Finally under Approach #3, this review covers institutionally-embedded explanations of 
initiative contest outcomes. These explanations place initiative politics into the context of 
the broader environment of multiple competing institutions of democratic policymaking. 
Additionally, Approach #3 will end with research into proposed objectives of initiative 
process actors which might operate on their behavior independently from passage 
objectives. That is to say, possible ballot initiative contest motivations which go beyond 
passage/defeat. 
 
Explanatory Approach #1: Money matters 
 What does the social science literature offer in terms of understanding the ability 
of policy-demanding actors to buy policy, in general? Where can we find those 
mechanisms whereby the financial expenditures of certain policy-demanding actors and 
groups influences the policy output of government at any level?  
  
13 
  
 This section begins by reviewing the older literature on the relationship between 
campaign expenditures and initiative contest outcomes. Then, the next subsection details 
the research conducted on the influence of moneyed policy-demanders in the legislatures, 
and how methodological breakthroughs in that field have been incorporated into thinking 
about ballot initiative contest outcomes.  
 Much has been written over the years debating the effect of campaign dollars in 
increasing or decreasing the likelihood voters will approve or reject a given statewide 
ballot initiative. This initial section of the Literature Review analyzes research which 
uses the passage (or vote share) of an initiative as the dependent variable, and the amount 
of money spent in support or opposition to an initiative will be the independent variables. 
In short: can money provided by policy-demanding individuals and groups be used to buy 
or prevent passage of an initiative? How and in what way does money spent in initiative 
campaigns influence outcomes? Is there an asymmetrical effect, wherein money is more 
effective in opposition to an initiative than it is in favor of it?  
 In the broadest possible terms, the scientific literature has shifted from an older 
literature downplaying the role of No campaign spending and almost total rejection of the 
efficacy of Yes campaign spending,12 towards a newer literature that challenges the 
research designs of past authors and argues that both Yes and No spending have 
significant and relatively symmetric effect.13  Along the way, breakthroughs in research 
on candidate elections were brought into the initiative literature with path-breaking 
                                                           
12
 Arthur Lupia and John Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, Annual 
Review of Political Science, Vol. 7, (2004) pgs. 463-482. 
13
 Thomas Stratmann, “The Effectiveness of Money in Ballot Measure Campaigns,” Southern California 
Law Review, Vol. 78 (2005); John de Figueiredo, Chang Ho Ji, and Thad Kousser, “Financing Direct 
Democracy: Revisiting the Research on Campaign Spending and Citizen Initiatives,” The Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2011).  
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consequences on findings. This forthcoming section will deal with this debate, and all of 
the explanatory models that get presented along the way. 
Early research finds limited effects and asymmetry 
 The earlier literature on the capacity of money to buy initiative contest outcomes 
suggests a limited and asymmetrical impact from campaign expenditures. Sometimes 
campaign spending was said to not matter much at all in determining election outcomes.14 
Other studies suggested that the only money that significantly impacted outcomes was 
spent by opposition groups seeking No votes.15 In sum, scholars agreed money was pretty 
ineffective at changing initiative contest outcomes. To the extent that it was influential, 
its influence reinforced the status quo, but could not purchase alteration of the current 
order through buying Yes votes. 
 Researchers John Owens and Larry Wade were among the early and long-
dominant voices in the academic literature who downplayed the ability of money from 
any group, on any side of an initiative contest, to affect outcomes. In a 1986 study, they 
                                                           
14
 John R. Owens and Larry L. Wade, “Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: 
Trends and Voting Effects,” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4, (1986) pgs. 675-689. 
15
 Steven Lydenberg, Bankrolling Ballots: The Role of Business in Financing State Ballot Question 
Campaigns, Council on Economic Priorities (1979); Ronald J. Allen, “The National Initiative Proposal: A 
Preliminary Analysis,” Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 58, (1979) pgs. 1034-1036; Randy M. Mastro, Deborah 
C. Costlow, and Heidi P. Sanchez, “Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum Process 
through Media Spending and What to Do about it,” Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 32, (1980) 
pgs. 315-269; David Lowenstein, “Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public 
Choice Theory, and the First Amendment,” UCLA Law Review, Vol. 86 (1982); David Magelby, Direct 
Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1984); John S. Shockley, “Direct Democracy, The Initiative Process in Colorado Politics: An Assessment , 
Boulder Bureau of Governmental Research and Services, University of Colorado (1980); John S. Shockley 
“Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts,” University of Miami Law Review, Vol. 39, (1985) 
pgs. 377-428; David D. Schmidt, Citizen Lawmakers: The Ballot Initiative Revolution, Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press (1989); David Magelby, “Direct Elections in the United States,” in Referendums 
Around the World, eds. David Butler and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC: The AEI Press (1994); Chang 
Ho Ji “California’s Direct Democracy 1976-1998: Predictors, Outcome, and Issues” (paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, 1998); Lupia and Matsusaka, “Direct 
Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions.” 
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examined campaign spending and election outcomes in the sixty years from 1924 until 
1984, and found no significant association or substantive relationship between the two. 
Using four statistical models that examined not just passage but also vote share, Owens 
and Wade concluded that “there is at best only a modest connection” between a 
campaign’s finances and its odds of success – a judgment highly skeptical of any role for 
money in buying initiative contest outcomes.16 
 Late 20th century academic explanations of the relationship between passage and 
campaign spending are easily characterized by a consensus on muted and asymmetric 
effects,17 but some disagreed with these conclusions, and few agreed entirely on the 
causation underlying them or the normative implications. With so much money spent in 
aggregate on both sides of initiative contests, Owens and Wade conclusions seemed 
counterintuitive at best. Why would campaigns attract and spend money in such large 
numbers if their expenditures did not increase a given initiative’s odds of passing?  
 Dissenters like Betty Zisk contended that money matters regardless of which side 
spends it.18 In 1987, Zisk performed a multi-state study of 50 ballot initiative campaigns 
occurring between 1976 and 1982 in four diverse states: California, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and Oregon. In her sample, the highest spending side prevailed on Election 
Day in 80 percent of the cases, regardless of the amount spent by the other side, the 
source of the money, or the issue type. Zisk’s findings suggested that public opinion on a 
ballot question could change drastically when one side heavily outspent the other, 
looking at 32 campaigns with available polling data and finding that 53 percent of the 
                                                           
16
 Owens and Wade, “Campaign Spending on California Ballot Propositions,” pgs. 33-35. 
17
 Lupia and Matsusaka, “Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions.” 
18
 Betty Zisk, Money, Media, and the Grass Roots. (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987). 
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time, voters’ initial preferences would shift towards whichever side spent the most 
money. 
 Other contemporary scholars saw campaign money as capable of determining 
election outcomes, but always with an asymmetrical effect in which if money spent in 
pursuit of Yes votes had any influence, it was significantly less relative to the purchasing 
power of money spent on No votes. Daniel Lowenstein made one of the earliest and most 
influential cases for this asymmetrical effect favoring money spent by an initiative’s 
opponents over that spent by its proponents.19 Lowenstein found that when the opponents 
outspent the proponents by at least 2:1, the opponents won 90 percent of the time. 
Conversely, if the proponents outspent the opponents by at least 2:1, the proponents only 
won 64% of the time.  This asymmetrical effect became a central part of the research and 
debate over the role of money in determining initiative contest outcomes. 
 Lowenstein’s contemporary, David Magelby, confirmed the existence of an 
asymmetrical effect favoring money spent in No campaigns over that spent in yes 
campaigns. Following Lowenstein’s approach closely, Magelby separates the measures 
into three categories based on whether the opponents, the proponents, or no one had a 2:1 
spending advantage. Magelby found that proponents with advantages won in less than 
half the cases. While at an 87 percent success rate, opponents with a 2:1 spending 
advantage could “virtually guarantee the defeat of an initiative.”20 That study was 
published in 1984. Ten years later in 1994, Magelby would again find evidence of the 
asymmetrical effect. Looking at the initiatives in the years since his last study, Magelby 
                                                           
19
 Lowenstein, “Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions.” 
20
 Magelby, Direct Legislation, pgs. 146-148. 
  
17 
  
found that ballot measures had failed in ten of the top eleven cases where the Yes 
campaign widely outspent the No campaign.21  
 Magelby postulated from his results that upon hearing information provided 
predominantly from the Yes side, voters became skeptical and tended to reject the 
propositions. Future scholars would build on this idea of a risk-averse voter.22 But for the 
time being, the main takeaway from Magelby’s work was to reinforce the asymmetrical 
effect theory associated with Lowenstein. The notion of asymmetrical effects in initiative 
campaign spending would crystalize into a conventional wisdom that has only recently 
been directly and forcefully challenged.23 
 Among this older body of literature, many of the older studies used simpler, 
bivariate modeling.24 More recent studies employed more complicated multivariate 
modeling to predict the fate of initiative by the levels of Yes and No spending.25 Overall 
though, the old literature is best characterized by two feature. First, the old literature 
provides evidence of muted and No-favoring asymmetric effectiveness of spending upon 
outcomes with near uniform consistency. Second, and more critically, the old literature 
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doesn’t take into account either the endogeneity of variables or the likelihood that 
spending is marginally less effective at higher levels.  
 The next subsection will examine how the literature on candidate elections 
experienced some of the same problems as initiative literature, and how methodological 
solutions introduced in the electoral context migrated into the arena of ballot initiative 
politics. 
 
Candidate contest outcomes and campaign spending: 
 When it comes to money in politics, the bulk of academic research focuses on 
candidate elections. This body of empirical literature is dominated by work which 
examines the relationship between campaign spending levels and the identity of winning 
candidates. In a 2005 literature review, Thomas Stratmann wrote, “While incumbents and 
challengers spend much time on fund-raising and appear to believe that money is an 
important ingredient in winning elections, academic researchers for the most part have 
trouble establishing a causal and quantitatively important connection between spending 
and vote shares.”26 The apparent ineffectiveness of incumbent campaign spending is one 
of the central puzzles of campaign finance literature. An already thorny causality 
question about campaign spending and candidate contest outcomes is made especially 
difficult in the case of incumbent spending.  
 Why do researchers struggle to demonstrate that spending, especially incumbent 
spending, produces causes changes in the identity of election winners? The problem is 
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largely one of endogeneity between the causal variable (spending) and the effect variable 
(contest outcomes). The causal logic of an experiment assumes that one’s independent 
and outcome variables are exogenous to each other. In a classic experimental context, this 
is accomplished using random assignment procedures. 
 However, in the quasi-experimental context researchers are left with groups 
which only exist out in the field. In the context of candidate races the argument is that 
spending, especially incumbent spending, is strategically made available to candidates by 
policy-demanders. Policy-demanders seek to win influence with the eventual winner of 
the election. For this reason, there is a tendency to try and pick winners. This strategy 
changes how the data must be interpreted, because there is something pointedly not 
random about the patterns through which campaign spending is being (assigned) made 
available to candidates. 
 There is a tendency for policy-demanders to try and pick winners, bandwagoning 
behind strong candidates who appear likely to win. Figure 2.2.1 depicts the endogeneity 
at play in this example. 
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FIGURE: 2.1.1: Endogeneity of candidate campaign spending to identity of 
Election Day winner 
 
 
 The strength of an incumbent’s challenger is likely to stimulate contributions for 
the incumbent. Likewise the tendency will be for higher funding to be directed towards 
challengers facing an uphill slough against strong incumbents. As Thomas Stratmann put 
it in a 2005 literature review on money in politics, “incumbents’ vote shares and spending 
are simultaneously determined.”27  Incumbents in competitive races may spend more to 
win reelection and lose than incumbents facing no serious challenge to win. This could 
lead to the erroneous conclusion that more campaign spending leads to smaller vote 
shares, or it could just bias estimates of the effectiveness of voting downwards towards 
zero. Either way, failing to control for the unobserved variables of incumbent and 
challenger quality leads to critical estimation errors. 
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The new literature on the effectiveness of spending: 
 Publishing in 1998, Susan Banducci would find asymmetry too.28 The previous 
scholars said that No spending was very effective, whereas Yes spending had no 
significant effect. Banducci found significant effects for Yes spending, but also the same 
asymmetrical effect favoring No spending. Money spent by initiative proponents has an 
effect on securing desired outcomes, Banducci claimed, it just is not as powerful as the 
effect of money spent by initiative opponents. There are smaller but still significant 
effects present for Yes spending. Banducci’s novel findings were in part owed to her 
novel research design. Her study acts as prelude to a new consensus around more 
substantive effects for both Yes and No  spending. In common with Banducci’s design, 
the new literature is marked by efforts to anticipate and factor out the endogeneity 
between the variables involved. 
 Banducci’s 1998 study aimed to develop a multivariate regression model with 
instrumental variables and multiple layers of controls that would explain initiative contest 
occurrences and outcomes. She first explained why certain initiatives qualified for the 
ballot, then why passage occurred when it did. Her novel methodological design would 
incorporate two new concepts that have critically shaped how subsequent studies 
approached these questions. First Banducci confronted the endogeneity of spending 
variables to contest outcome variables. Second, Banducci recognized the diminishing 
marginal returns to which campaign spending is subject. 
 Banducci’s study examined all direct legislation contests which occurred in 2 
states – California and Oregon – between 1976 and 1990. Drawing upon the insight of 
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Jacobson (1980), Banducci argued that “because [the level of Yes spending] is a response 
to the appearance of a strong challenge… [Yes spending] is not a variable that is 
completely external to any model that predicts initiative voting.”29 Via Banducci, Yes and 
No spending levels are “wrapped up in each other,” or to use to jargon of statistics, they 
are multicolinear variables.30  
 So, given the endogeneity of spending, Banducci argued for the power of 
applying a “two-stage model and some indicator of the controversy or competitiveness of 
each proposition to correctly specify how spending affects outcomes.”31 The first stages 
of Banducci’s passage model predicted an initiative’s Yes spending. She constructed 
indicators that reflect how competitive or controversial each ballot initiative was. Among 
these indicators, Banducci included a measure of whether or not a proposition contained 
provisions regulating or taxing an industry. Banducci’s indicators of controversiality and 
competitiveness are regressed on Yes spending to predict how much Yes spending is 
fueled by the threat of opposition.  
 In the second stage of Banducci’s model, Yes spending predicted in the first stage 
is used, along with No spending, to predict contest outcomes. Through this two-stage 
model, Banducci aimed to isolate and eliminate the effects on Yes spending that are 
driven by the anticipated closeness or competitiveness of contests. This approach, 
informed by innovations in research on electoral politics, would come to define the new 
approach to estimating money’s effectiveness in determining contest outcomes. 
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 Beyond tackling endogeneity, Banducci’s research design was also novel for its 
incorporation of her awareness of the diminishing marginal returns to which campaign 
spending is subject. Via Banducci, it is likely that the marginal returns on Yes and No 
spending are reduced at very high levels of spending. To factor this dynamic in, Banducci 
uses the natural log of Yes and No expenditures in order to help model the potential 
nonlinear effects of spending on outcomes.  
 In regards to the first stage of her model, Banducci’s 1998 study posited a 
“significant relationship between [Yes and No] spending, suggesting that [Yes] spending 
is a function of [No] spending.”32 Banducci claimed that her equations deployed in the 
first stage “explain over 40% of the variation in [Yes] spending on all of these 
propositions.”33 In terms of the second stage estimates, Banducci found that “once [Yes] 
spending has been purged of effects shared with [No] spending, [Yes] spending does have 
a significant inverse effect on the proportion of people voting ‘no’ on ballot measures in 
both states.”34 
 Consistent with past authors, Banducci found an assymetric effect where, dollar 
for dollar, No spending had “a much greater impact on votes” than Yes spending.35 
However, where past studies had found that Yes spending was generally ineffective, 
Banducci found that Yes spending was indeed a significant factor in contest outcomes, 
even if relative to No spending its effect appeared more limited. Banducci’s innovation 
was the incorporation of methodological tools which accounted for the endogeneity of 
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campaign spending and the nonlinear nature of its effects upon vote share. Banducci’s 
work opened the door for a new line of studies which, in turn, have overturned the old 
consensus on muted and asymmetric effects for campaign expenditures in shaping 
initiative contest outcomes. 
 The most recent research on the effectiveness of money in ballot initiative 
contests challenges the conceptualization of critically limited and asymmetrical effects 
for campaign spending. Thomas Stratmann’s 2005 article on the effectiveness of ballot 
measure campaign money begins with the author placing himself within the context of a 
broader field of academic research on electoral campaigns. That literature, as Stratmann 
characterized it, had long been plagued by great difficulties in establishing the causal link 
between the magnitude of resources spent by policy-demanding actors and the respective 
passage or defeat of their preferred policy or, as the case may be, candidate. Stratmann’s 
2005 and 2006 research distances itself from a body of literature he considered to have 
confused “mere correlation”36 for explanation. By “disentangl[ing] the causal effects” of 
campaign spending upon passage, Stratmann reasoned that a novel research design could 
“find that interest group pressures can change political outcomes.”37 In short, Stratmann 
identified a large problem (the endogeneity problem) that had long undercut most all 
explanations of initiative contest outcomes. 
 A causal argument necessitates a counter-factual. Something surely cannot be said 
to cause an event without an understanding of how and why the outcome could have 
unfolded differently. In experiments, the control group provides evidence of the 
                                                           
36Stratmann, “The Effectiveness of Money,” p. 103. 
37
 Ibid. 
  
25 
  
counterfactual. But all too often in political science, counterfactuals can be extremely 
difficult to establish in quasi-experimental designs employing field data. The Stratmann 
research design grapples with the counterfactual dilemma though its decision to 
“establish a benchmark against which to evaluate the effectiveness of campaigning.”  
Stratmann seeks this “benchmark” in the form of an indicator he constructs to gauge a 
given initiatives initial likelihood of passage. A measurement of underlying voter 
sentiment is used to estimate an initiative’s initial likelihood of passage.  
 Stratmann argued that an explanation of money’s causal power required a 
“technique that accounts for the fact that groups act strategically and that interest groups 
determine how much they spend based on underlying voter sentiment.”38 In other words, 
mere correlations underestimated the effectiveness of Yes spending by failing to 
appreciate the tendency for contributions to be systematically directed towards initiatives 
that began the campaign with dismal public support. Meanwhile “sure thing” campaigns 
recurrently begin with a high probability of passage and attract little spending. The 
strategic behavior or policy-demanding individuals and groups consistently organizes the 
field data in a way that would cause distorted estimates if not properly accounted for in 
the estimation procedures. 
 Stramann’s data comes from 18 ballot measure contests that occurred in 36 
counties within the state of California between 2000 and 2004. Stratmann substitutes 
television advertising spending for total campaign spending, and his main analytical unit 
is the county. An indicator was specifically constructed for each county to gauge 
underlying voter sentiment regarding each initiative. Additionally, an indicator was 
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constructed for each of the 36 ballot measures to capture the underlying voter sentiment 
at a statewide level. Stratmann then employs fixed-effect estimation on the data. His unit 
of observation is a measure of the vote share for each ballot measure within a particular 
county. 
 The findings from Stramann’s study were significant and path-breaking. “These 
results,” Stratmann wrote, “sharply contrast with the findings of previous studies.”39 Yes 
spending was found to be at least as productive as No spending. There were even cases 
where Yes spending was found to be significantly more productive than No spending. 
This suggested that Yes spending had no predetermined disadvantage in the effort to 
affect voter behavior. 
 Breaking with the large majority of previous studies, Stratmann claimed evidence 
of statistically significant effects for both Yes and No spending. Furthermore, these 
effects were judged to be roughly symmetrical. Stratmann concluded that one could infer 
the potential for interest groups to offset one another’s spending. An effective counter-
campaign can partially – or often completely – offset the influence of spending from 
other policy demanding individuals and groups. 
 Like Banducci and Stratmann before them, the next authors to tackle this topic 
would craft their research techniques to account for the endogeneity of campaign 
spending to ballot measure outcomes. A classic technique for dealing with endogeneity 
problems involves the use of instrumental variables. The previous section dealt with 
methodological breakthroughs in the congressional research context where instrumental 
variable techniques were utilized to address endogeneity problems. In doing so, this 
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research transformed the academic understanding of the causal properties of interest 
group spending in electoral politics. 
 The 2011 article authored by John de Figueiredo, Chang Ho Ji, and Thad Kousser 
employed an instrumental variable design and found, like Stratmann, significant and 
roughly symmetrical effects. Like Stramann, de Figueriedo et al. prefaced their research 
designs by running their data through the sort of simpler correlational models which 
implicitly assumed the exogeneity of variables when used to make inferences about the 
effectiveness of campaign spending. The authors find that, indeed, using the old cruder 
methods of the old literature, the effects of the spending within their dataset does indeed 
appear to be muted and asymmetrical. 
 De Figueiredo et al. highlighted two recurrent patterns of strategic behavior seen 
in policy-demanding individuals and groups in regards to their likelihood of financing 
ballot initiative contest campaigns. In the first recurrent strategic situation, “narrow 
interests often spend large sums to pass measures with slim majorities.” Whereas in the 
second situation, a measure with wide appeal is able to spend less and still achieve 
passage. Failing to take into account the strategic behavior of policy-demanding actors 
leads to one’s research becoming invalidated by the sort of endogeneity problem depicted 
in Figure 2.1.2 
 
  
FIGURE 2.1.2: Endogeneity problem plaguing estimates of the effect of spending 
upon passage rates 
 
 
 De Figueiredo et al. argue
disappears when “more fle
“how the concentration of costs and benefits can determine financial support for a policy 
proposal.”40 Their study analyzed 
dataset contained 328 contests in all
used by Stratmann to include seven times as long of a time period, de Figueiredo et al. 
aimed to establish greater ex
Figueiredo et al. examine
like Stratmann. Multiple instrumental variables are used, which vary across each of the 
329 observations. Their major instruments are measures reflecting the level of 
concentration of costs and benefits to the public represented for a given ballot initiative.
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 This typology of distributions of costs and benefits was adapted from past 
authors41 and will be critical to the research design of this th
Figures 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 depict
the concentration of costs and benefits, 
ballot initiatives. 
FIGURE 2.1.3: Recurrent strategic situation where narrow groups spend large on 
initiatives with slim chances of passing
 
 
 In the first strategic situation see
initiative advocacy of narrow
best indicating intention to vote 
leads to underestimating the effect of spending, especially 
groups. In the second strategic situation seen in Figure 2.1.4, broad groups pass initiatives 
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which is almost as large as the 1.90 percent decrease in the initial likelihood of passage 
that would result from an additional $100,0000 of opposition spending.”42  
 This author is a little critical of the conclusions that de Figueiredo et al. draw from 
their calculations. Though these sorts of numbers indicate that spending could have 
meaningful effects in extremely tight races, it also suggests that money is only 
meaningful on the margins and that a broader set of circumstances is actually responsible 
for determining whether the contest is anywhere near the level of tightness where 
measure committees can realistically spend their way to victory.  
 As this literature review has so far demonstrated, Banducci, Stratmann, and de 
Figueiredo et al. broke with the past and employed sophisticated nonexperimental 
research designs to counter the endogeneity problem they recognized in the literature. 
Interestingly, all who have made explicit efforts to account for the endogeneity problem 
in recent years have found significant and symmetrical effects for ballot initiative contest 
spending. Recently, Todd Rogers and Joel Middleton’s 2012 study tackled the 
endogeneity dilemma through an experimental research design. A precinct-randomized 
field experiment was conducted on the influence of a ballot measure committee (initiative 
contest-oriented PACs) upon initiative outcomes. 
 Rogers and Middleton’s novel and genuinely experimental approach involved 
collaboration with a PAC (Defend Oregon) that sought to sway the outcome of twelve 
ballot initiative contests in the 2008 general election in Oregon. The PAC sent between 
one and two informative ballot guides to most households in the state. The experiment 
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involved randomly assigning 200 out of the 700 precincts to a control group who did not 
receive the intervention in the form of Defend Oregon’s informative literature. 
 Vote margin was Rogers and Middleton’s main dependent variable. They used 
regression to estimate the average change in precinct-level vote attributable to the 
treatment. They estimated the models using ordinary least squares regression.43 The 
authors found that the treatment had sizable effects in the intended direction on the vote 
margin for 10 of the 12 ballot initiatives. “Effects on vote margin ranged from 2.5 
percentage points to 6 percentage points. Interestingly, the only 2 (of 12) contests where 
the treatment was judged to be not statistically effective were also the only two ballot 
initiatives judged to be essentially uncontested in terms of campaign activity. 
 The results of Rogers and Middleton’s 2012 experiment added to a growing body 
of evidence suggesting a more significant and symmetrical causal role for campaign 
spending in ballot initiative contest outcomes than was previously understood to be the 
case. However, one needs to be cautious in making the inductive jump from the observed 
effectiveness of Defend Oregon’s informative pamphlet to the general effectiveness of 
campaign spending. The context-dependent nature of data limits the sorts of conclusions 
one can soundly draw from it. 
 
Voter decision-making: 
 On a microfoundational level, the debates between scholars on the proper 
methods for measuring the effectiveness of ballot initiative contest spending are 
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conducted in the shadow of another question: how capable are voters in making choices 
that are consistent with their interests and values? The voter competence literature 
pertains to that social process-arrow in the causal-mechanistic explanatory model (see 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2). How do goal-directed voters make choices in ballot initiative 
contests in an environment with multiple competing sources of information and rhetoric? 
 In their 1998 book Demanding Choices, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan 
examine whether and how voters are capable of performing the demanding task of 
accurately expressing their interests and values through voting in ballot initiative 
contests.44 In line with the conventional wisdom, they found spending against a 
proposition was associated with greater negative voting,45 and there was no evidence of a 
significant relationship between affirmative campaign expenditure and voting in favor of 
initiatives.46 However, Donovan and Bowler’s innovation was to gesture towards a more 
sophisticated model of the micro-mechanisms connecting campaign expenditures to a 
voter’s initiative contest decision-making. The authors explored the ways in which 
spending affects opinions in less direct ways than a crude “buying votes” model suggests. 
 Donovan and Bowler proposed that heavy spending focuses more media and 
interpersonal discussion on particular initiatives. Thus, increasing the chance that voters 
will be able to evaluate the proposal within one of the standing conceptual frameworks 
they already possess. Instead of converting opinions, highly contested campaigns are said 
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to enhance the voter’s ability to answer questions such as “who’s behind it?” and “what’s 
in it for me?”47  
 High spending on any side increases the availability of free cues, independent of 
the paid campaigns, which prevent heavy one-sided spending from ensuring passage. 
High overall spending fosters public awareness of whether a small number of clearly 
identifiable groups or firms are involved in a campaign.48 In this way, the Donovan and 
Bowler build upon John Zaller’s insight that the effects of values on political attitudes are 
not automatic, but rely on elite cues for motivation.49 
 The indirect effects of campaign spending that Donovan and Bowler postulate in 
Demanding Choices, may stem from the fact that overall spending drives overall 
awareness. Larger-scale spending may occasionally have paradoxical effect of provoking 
a backlash, raising opposition to a given proposition. In their own way, Donovan and 
Bowler affirm the asymmetrical effects framework, stating that well-funded groups are 
able to influence outcomes, but their influence appears to be much more capable of 
generating defensive-No votes than affirmative Yes votes. An effective No campaign can 
generate enough doubt and information overload that voters are driven to pick the safety 
of the status quo as a default.  
 However, suggesting the larger ineffectiveness of campaign money to buy 
initiative outcomes, Donovan and Bowler explain how spending by either side will 
generate discussion that cements opinion into fixed cleavages, generating more public 
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cues that allow voters to evaluate proposals through the frame of enduring ideological 
and party affiliated criterion. Donovan and Bowler 
who is empowered, but also sometimes overwhelmed, by the information generated by 
campaigns spending. Influentially, Donovan and Bowler captured how initiative 
entrepreneurs are involved in exploiting, not transforming,
moment. 
FIGURE 2.1.5: Bowler and Donovan’s explanation of asymmetric effects, risk
averse voters, and status quo bias in the initiative process
  
 
Conclusions: 
 Looking back on the most recent study in this Literature Review, the Rogers and 
Middleton (2012) experiment finally promised to overcome some of the inherent 
limitations of the quasi-experimental designs to which past studies had been almost 
completely limited. Though somewhat illuminating, there still remain numerous critical 
limitations on the potential to generalize from the results of Rogers and Middleton’s 
experiment to a general confirmation of the effectiveness of 
voters to approve passage. In a self
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Daniel Little, the author presents a critique of a hypothetical study, a study which is 
similar in some ways to that of Roger and Middleton and many others.50 
 Little begins with the underlying assumption that voters have a “prior set of 
attitudes towards an issue – perhaps including a large number of ‘don’t know/don’t care’ 
people.” This underlying voter sentiment could conceivably be measured with a 
significant level of validity and a sufficiently stable degree of reliability. Next, 
conceptually, Yes and No campaigns are mounted to lobby the public pro and con. Then, 
on Election Day, voters indicate their approval in proportions that are often markedly 
different from the approval distribution indicated by the initial measurement of 
underlying voter sentiment. 
 Little’s piece notes how, upon initial inspection, the situation appears to be 
“potentially a very simple area for causal reasoning.” Via Little, the situation’s initial 
explanatory potential comes from several elements: 1) the highly and consistently 
observable outcome variables, 2) the presence of interventions that are usually observable 
as well, both in terms of timing and magnitude. Moreover, 3) if a researcher has a 
sufficiently large number of measurements from which to draw inferences, they will 
establish support for an assumption that an observed correlation probably was not caused 
by random variation in the variables. 
 After laying out the strengths of his hypothetical initiative contest outcome 
research design, Little argued that results from it could not credibly establish that a group 
caused a change in the outcome a contest. Little identifies all of the elements for reaching 
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a solid piece of “singular causal reasoning” about “one population, one issue, and a 
specific set of interventions.” However, the situation lacks that “which would be needed 
in order to arrive at a conclusion of generic scope.” The external validity becomes 
increasingly tenuous as the purpose of the research design moves from explaining the 
effects of money in specific situations towards research designs intended to support more 
general claims about the universal causal properties of campaign spending. 
 To overcomes these kind of external validity problems without compromising the 
scope of one’s explanatory goals, Little prescribes a research plan re-design which 
incorporates a more extended set of cases in which a greater variety of strategies are 
likely to be seen coming into play. However, even when the sample is large and diverse 
in one of Little’s hypothetical experiments, he argues a researcher should reconsider the 
validity of using “this body of data… [to] arrive at estimates of the relative efficacy of 
[different] treatments.” A trade-off is made as the sample expands and discrete situations 
are collapsed into a single artificially homogeneous category. 
 In this brief and incisive piece of online philosophy of social science analysis, the 
bottom-line question is whether the resources exist to perform a study of initiative contest 
outcome causality that can “provide guidance for other campaigns over other issues in 
other places.” Little casts doubt on the possibility of providing such context-independent, 
transportable guidance. He points to stubborn explanatory limits which plague attempts at 
vigorously establishing broad evidence of the basic properties of “causing public 
opinion.” 
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 Little’s critique explains why this Literature Review reaches the conclusion that, 
when research looks solely to quantify the significance of campaign spending as an 
explanation of initiative contest outcomes, it ignores the immutable heterogeneity of 
modes and forms of campaign expenditures (interventions).  What is more, it ignores the 
contingencies which enable and contain the effects of money. A very large and diverse 
sample is needed to reach broadly generalizable estimates of the effect of campaign 
spending. However, gains made in parsimony come hand-in-hand with a degree of 
blindness to the important contingencies and heterogeneity that structure the data.  
 Upon reviewing the Approach #1 literature, this author finds the explanations of 
money, even when seemingly sound from an econometric perspective, offer an insular 
and impoverished explanation of the deeper causes of contest outcomes. Those studies 
that do manage to capture the econometrics properly though, like de Figueiredo et al.’s 
2011 study, do so by grounding their data in controls built from instrumental variables 
which speak to a deeper layer of causal narratives. Some of these instrumental variable 
sets come from the cost-benefit distribution of particular initiatives, which will be the 
topic of this next section on Approach #2. 
 In the next section on Approach #2, this Literature Review will examine a group 
of scholars who look explicitly at the connection between the internal characteristics of a 
group and the strategies that groups leverage to secure their desired initiative contest 
outcomes. 
 
Explanatory Approach #2: Cost-benefit distribution 
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 In the previous section, a group of scholars were featured who transformed the 
literature on the effectiveness of money by confronting the endogeneity of campaign 
spending to ballot initiative contest outcomes. They did so by tracing the causal influence 
of money backwards, deeper into the causal relationship to ask the question, “Why do 
some ballot initiative campaigns have more money than others in the first place?” The 
first stage of de Figueiredo et al.’s 2011 research model is based on the cost-benefit 
distribution at stake in a given initiative contest. Those authors were building upon the 
insights of the researchers examined in this section of the Literature Review. 
 Do policy-demanding individuals and groups find political leverage in the cost-
benefit distribution at stake in a given initiative contest?  Does the initiative process the 
present a tool for narrow economic interests to “buy” preferred policy? Or is it the other 
way around: Do broad-based citizen groups leverage the ballot initiative process to 
overcome collective action problems and secure policy-demands with broad appeal? This 
Approach #2 section will cover a body of the literature that explains ballot initiative 
successes through the internal characteristics of policy-demanding groups and the relative 
concentration or diffusion of the costs and benefits at stake. 
 The Approach #2 section of the literature review begins with some background on 
collective action problems and the concepts of breadth and narrowness of costs and 
benefits associated with particular initiatives. The idea is that different political dynamics 
characterize the conflicts between affirmative and oppositional initiative advocates. 
These political dynamics are based on the relative concentration or diffusion, as well as 
the magnitude of cost and benefit at stake in a contest. 
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 These costs and benefits are supposedly embodied in the substance of policies 
under this approach. Studies will be examined that categorize initiative contests within a 
4-type system based on the four “political situations” associated with cost-benefit 
distribution among Yes and No demanding actors. The Approach #2 literature review then 
examines work on the differences in the operations and effectiveness of different types of 
policy-demanding individuals and groups. Elizabeth Gerber’s research will be examined, 
which classifies citizen interest groups and economic interest groups within the initiative 
arena. Also examined will be the work of those researchers who built upon her insights. 
Emphasis is put on Gerber’s assertion that the initiative process is a site where broad 
“citizens group” can leverage a comparative advantage they possess in terms of their 
personnel power. Broad interests do indeed appear to wield some sort of competitive 
advantage in the ballot initiative arena. The exact mechanism behind this remains an open 
question. 
 
Collective action problems 
 The American tradition of political thought is deeply influenced by the arguments 
of James Madison. Madison highlighted a fundamental problem facing all democracies; 
designing governments in such a manner as to provide for stability, energy, and liberty. 
For Madison, the greatest threat to a democracy came from the destabilizing potential of 
mass participation in government. Madison advocated for a system of government that 
maintained a balance between the energetic dynamism brought about by mass 
participation and the stability provided through checks, balances, and a representative 
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form of government. As Elizabeth Gerber put it, “all across America and at all levels of 
government, the institutionalization of Madisonian ideals limited the power of the 
majority.”51 
 Mancur Olson’s pivotal 1965 book, The Logic of Collective Action, blazed the 
path for what is now arguably an entire paradigm of political science that draws on a 
distinctly economistic mode of explanation. Olson’s work was based on a theory of 
concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs. Groups, via Olson, are defined by the interests 
which animate them. The characteristics of a group’s animating interest define a group’s 
internal characteristics. In turn, the internal characteristics of a group determine the 
strategies and resources available to it. 
 Via Olson’s account, groups acting to protect diffuse interests are systemically 
plagued by collective action problems caused by the incentive to free ride. In contrast, 
groups seeking narrowly concentrated benefits will find that their situation is much more 
conducive to coordinating collective action to achieve their goals. Olson’s main theme is 
the difficulty that groups have cooperating without coercion to control them. The larger 
the group, the less excludible the stakes involved, the less probability that group members 
can be motivated to take action. 
 Olson’s argument carries major implications for the logic underlying Madisonian 
political institutions. Via Madison, in a democracy, the most significant concern is that a 
majority will tyrannize and exploit the minority. Via Olson, the critical concern becomes 
that a well-organized minority will find itself able to enact policies which cut against the 
interests of broad majorities. Olson’s logic suggests that narrow, well-organized 
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majorities will secure the enactment of policies that deliver narrow benefits and impose 
broad costs. Perhaps, in light of Olson’s findings, institutions would be better organized 
to guard against the potential for narrow factions to exploit the distortions of 
representative government in order to “tyrannize” the majority. The ballot initiative is the 
sort of non-Madisonian institution that might mitigate the undesirable distortions caused 
by the perverse logic of collective action. 
 In a 1972 journal article, Theodore Lowi drew attention to the relationship 
between the substance of policies and the sorts of political mobilization that occurred to 
support or oppose them.52 Lowi created a three-category scheme for classifying policies 
according to the cost-benefit distribution that would occur as a result of their enactment. 
Via Lowi, “Policies determine politics.”53 James Q. Wilson’s 1980 book, The Politics of 
Regulation, would build on this important theoretical insight.54 Wilson’s cost-benefit 
distribution typology describes “four political situations” that result from four different 
types of policies. Wilson’s typology is displayed below in Figure 2.2.1 
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FIGURE 2.2.1: Wilson’s typology of policies and political situations 
 
 
 Writing in 1980, Wilson sought to explain the passage of “new or social 
regulations” of the 1960s and 1970s in the realm of environmental-protection laws and 
auto-safety rules. Olson’s logic of group action had suggested the apparent improbability 
of such regulatory action, taken where the benefits of action were broadly diffused and 
the costs were narrowly concentrated. 
 Wilson applied his typology in the context of bureaucratic politics. He traced the 
political motives that shaped the demand for business regulation as well as the conditions 
of business capture. But, decades later, Wilson’s schematic would be transported to the 
study of state ballot initiative politics. In an unpublished paper presented at a political 
science conference in 1997, Anne Campbell first introduced the Wilson typology into the 
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context of ballot initiative contests.55 As Campbell revealed, ballot initiative politics are 
distinctly fertile soil for Wilsonian analysis because the contests are each attachable to 
the acceptance or rejection of a defined policy option.  
 Campbell’s data set included the 57 statewide initiatives voted on by Coloradans 
between 1966 and 1994, as classified using Wilson’s two-by-two policy matrix. 
Campbell assigned the initiatives to the categories based on her “assessment of the most 
likely and immediate consequences of the passage of an initiative, in terms of whether the 
general public or specific interests would bear the economic, political, and/or social costs 
and benefits.”56 The assessment was informed by the author’s review of the initiatives 
themselves, as well as newspaper articles and editorials, and the arguments set forth in 
the nonpartisan informative literature prepared by the Colorado Legislative Council. 
 Campbell began her research with several specific hypotheses. These hypotheses 
were informed by her broader “proposal that the initiative process is not conducive to… 
[abuse] by wealthy individuals and special interests… and that it should therefore serve 
primarily as a means of serving the public interest rather than private interests.”57 Her 
first hypothesis was that there would be significantly more entrepreneurial and 
majoritarian initiatives (broad Yes side) combined than there were client and interest 
group initiatives (narrow Yes side). This hypothesis was confirmed by her findings 
wherein two-thirds of the 57 initiatives aimed to enact policies which sought general 
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public benefits.58 Campbell also found the highest voting rates within client and 
majoritarian contests, suggesting to her that “voters are more interested and 
knowledgeable about the issues for which they will have to bear the costs.”59 
 Campbell’s final hypothesis regarded the pattern of success rates for the different 
types of initiatives. True to her hypothesis, Campbell found the highest success rate for 
majoritarian initiatives, followed by entrepreneurial initiatives in second place. 
“Basically,” Campbell wrote, “one half of entrepreneurial and majoritarian initiatives 
passed, compared to 37% of all initiatives.”60 Client politics initiative contests were 
found to be the least likely to pass. Only 8 percent (1 out of 12) of the clientelistic 
initiatives passed within Campbell’s thirty year Colorado sample. 
 Campbell’s application of the Wilson typology would be repeated in a 1998 book 
chapter by Todd Donvan, Shaun Bowler, David McCuan, and Ken Fernandez. Like 
Campbell, these authors found reason to doubt explanations of ballot initiative passage 
that looked to the financial resources of wealthy, narrow interests. “Despite the escalating 
costs of direct democracy” campaigns, Donovan et al. observed “that organized groups 
with modest resources – groups who represent fairly broad, diffuse constituencies – d 
continue to place measures on the ballot that do pass… A respectable proportion of these 
measures pass in spite of the fact that they threaten well-organized, wealthy interests who 
wage expensive opposition campaigns.”61 Donovan et al. examined the factors that allow 
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these “fairly broad, diffuse constituencies” with modest financial resources to 
successfully challenge wealthy, well-organized interests in the initiative arena.  
 Following Campbell’s approach, Donovan et al. classified initiatives into the four 
categories from Wilson’s typology. Donovan et al. looked at 53 ballot initiatives that 
appeared on California General Election ballots between 1986 and 1996. Echoing 
Campbell’s results, Donovan et al. found that clientelistic-type initiatives were the least 
likely to pass. Speaking to the asymmetry literature, the authors wrote that “money spent 
by proponents in this arena is largely wasted.”62 Only 14 percent of clientelistic initiatives 
passed and the average vote for these initiatives was a mere 28 percent in favor.63 Interest 
group politics contests were also found to be very unlikely to end in passage. Just like 
clientelistic-type initiatives, only 14 percent of interest group initiatives passed, in 
contrast to a 41.5 percent overall passage rate. Like Campbell’s, Donovan et al.’s 
findings suggest that the ballot initiative process displays a recurrent pattern wherein 
broad, diffuse interests tend to hold an advantage over narrow, excludible interests. 
 Campbell found in her 1997 study that two-thirds of the initiatives in her sample 
involved broadly diffused benefits for Yes sides (entrepreneurial and majoritarian 
initiatives).64 Donovan et al. similarly found that almost three-fourths of the initiatives in 
their sample would benefit broadly-based consistencies. However, whereas Campbell 
placed the majority (54 percent) of her initiatives in the entrepreneurial category, 
Donovan et al. placed the plurality (47 percent) of their initiatives in the majoritarian 
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category.65 In contrast to all other types of initiatives in the Donovan et al. study, a clear 
majority (58 percent) of majoritarian contests ended in passage. 
 In a 2005 book chapter titled “Can’t Buy Me Love,” David McCuan would 
expand upon his use of the Wilson typology in the 1997 piece with Donovan, Bowler, 
and Fernandez. McCuan’s focus this time around was on the professionalization of a 
ballot initiative system that was originally “designed as a process for amateurs to work 
around powerful, entrenched interests.”66 McCuan categorized ballot initiatives using the 
Wilson typology and a data set made up of all 93 citizens’ initiatives that appeared on the 
California ballot from 1984 through 1998. The typology was supplemented by an 
analysis of how campaigns actually spend campaign dollars, listed in categories including 
media and print advertising, professional consulting expenditures, cash transfers to other 
campaigns, and other categories. 
 Like Campbell and Donovan et al., McCuan’s 2005 study found over two-thirds 
of all initiative contests featured broad Yes sides. In keeping with his earlier work with 
Donovan et al., McCuan found a plurality of all contests (47 percent) to fit into the 
majoritarian category.67 In sharp contrast to all other contest, 60 percent of majoritarian 
contests ended in passage. This made majoritarian initiatives 3 times more likely to 
succeed than the next most successful type (entrepreneurial).  
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 This literature review has devoted so much attention to the findings of initiative 
scholars who used the Wilson typology because it is part of the research design included 
under Methods (Chapter 3). 
 
Citizen groups, economic groups, and initiative politics 
 In her 1999 book on direct legislation, Elisabeth R. Gerber argued that it was “a 
mistake to equate money with influence in the context of” ballot initiative contests. “Big 
spending,” Gerber wrote, “does not imply big influence.”68 Gerber presented evidence 
that different types of policy-demanders sought different types of influence in the direct 
legislation process. Her work acknowledges the multiplicity of interest groups and 
considers the differences between several different types of groups (economic vs. citizen, 
wealthy vs. less wealthy, narrow vs. broad-based). For Gerber, “the very existence of 
such diverse groups is a function of their internal characteristics and their ability to 
overcome inherent hurdles.”69 She traces how a group’s internal characteristics determine 
the strategies it chooses. 
 Gerber’s work is based on a conceptual premise that considers interest groups in 
the ballot initiative process as “analogous to profit-maximizing firms as they are 
characterized in microeconomics… [because] like firms, an interest group’s resources 
determine which political strategies it can afford to pursue and whether the interest group 
achieves its goals”70 Gerber’s profit-maximizing firm analogy is useful because it 
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emphasizes the constrained maximization problem that confronts both firms and interest 
groups. 
 Gerber borrows the concept of comparative advantage from the economic 
literature. Just as firms attempt to maximize profits by choosing between alternative 
modes of production (i.e., capital intensive or labor intensive), “interest groups have 
comparative advantages in mobilizing the different resources required by direct 
legislation strategies.”71 An interest group’s ability to mobilize monetary and personnel 
resources is determined by its membership composition.  
 Membership composition determines the nature of a group’s collective action 
problem.72 “Groups whose members are primarily firms and organizational 
representatives can more easily mobilize monetary resources, whereas groups whose 
members are primarily autonomous individuals can more easily mobilize personnel 
resources.”73 Gerber argued that the ballot initiative process presents a competitive 
advantage for those groups who hold an advantage in mobilizing personnel resources. 
 In terms of data, Gerber relied on two main sources. First, she collected and 
synthesized campaign finance reports from four different states (California, Idaho, 
Nebraska, and Oregon) over a four year period (1988-1992). Secondly, she drew upon the 
results of a survey she conducted in the spring of 1996. The survey was mailed to 600 
interest groups that were active in initiative contests and candidate races between 1988 
and 1992 in the same four states from which the campaign finance data was drawn. Half 
of the surveys were sent to groups who sought to affect the outcome of ballot initiative 
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contests. The other half of the surveys were sent to groups who contributed to statewide 
candidate races but stayed financially removed from initiative politics. 156 surveys were 
returned to Gerber completed, making for a response rate of about 26%. 
 Central to Gerber’s analysis is a distinction between “citizen interests” and 
“economic interests.”74 Citizen interests are represented by the activities of citizens 
groups, occupational groups, and individuals, whereas economic interests are represented 
by the activities of economic interest groups, professional groups, and businesses. In this 
context of Approach #2, “citizen interests” represent broad-based interests and diffuse 
benefits. “Economic interests” represent narrow interests and private, concentrated 
benefits. 
 From her analysis of the survey responses, Gerber found that citizen interests 
were significantly more likely to finance Yes campaigns and report assigning a greater 
level of importance to passing new laws by initiative.75 Economic interests, on the other 
hand, were found to be much more likely to either only engage in the initiative process 
defensively (financing No campaigns) or to use the initiative process in pursuit of indirect 
influence, meaning their goal was not to achieve passage through the initiative process 
directly but rather to signal and pressure the legislature. 
 From the campaign finance data, Gerber finds evidence to support her hypothesis 
and corroborate her analysis of the survey responses. Within the time period and states 
examined, Gerber found economic interests directed an overwhelming share of their 
contributions (74 percent) to No campaigns rather than to supporting Yes campaigns (26 
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percent). Conversely, Gerber found that citizens’ interests directed an equally greater 
share of their contributions (72 percent) to supporting Yes campaigns rather than 
opposing initiatives. Overall, Gerber explains ballot initiative success as the result of 
broad-based citizen groups leveraging their personnel power to pass ballot initiatives. 
Diffuse interests use the initiative process to help overcome collective action problems.  
 The results Gerber came to must be discounted to the degree across-group 
differences in survey response patterns limit the statistical significance she measures. 
Additionally, testing her theories about personnel advantages versus financial advantages 
becomes a bit of a moving target when we consider the evolving nature of 
communication technologies and regulations surrounding the process. Technological 
changes are capable of transforming the relative importance of personnel advantages in 
ballot initiative contests. 
 Gerber’s work built on a congressional literature that had long interrogated the 
composition of contributions to candidate campaigns. What factors caused the 
contribution levels that made massive spending efforts possible? If the literature 
suggested money could not buy influence then why was so much money spent? Or, 
alternatively, if the literature reflected that money could significantly impact outcomes, 
then why was so little money spent in politics? 
 A 2002 article by Stephen Ansolabehere, John de Figueiredo, and James Snyder, 
the authors considered why, in light of the enormous value of public policies at stake, 
was there so little money in U.S. politics. The authors “argue that campaign contributions 
are not a form of policy-buying, but rather a form of political participation and 
  
52 
  
consumption.”76 The authors use descriptive statistics and an econometric analysis to 
provide evidence that campaign spending is a “normal good dependent upon income.”  
 First the authors demonstrate that almost all campaign money comes in the form 
of ‘hard’ contributions that must abide by limitations.77 Then analysis was performed on 
the 1999-2000 election cycle. Of the $3 billion raised by candidates and party 
committees, “individuals contributed nearly $2.4 billion, the public treasury paid 
$235million, and about $380 million came directly from the treasuries of corporations, 
unions, and other associations.”78 The authors concluded that, for candidate races, 
“individuals are by far the largest and most important source of campaign funds.”79  
 Ansolabehere et al. theorized that campaign contributions mainly represent 
consumption and participation. They test their theory against the rent-seeking models 
which predict that total government spending should explain total campaign spending. 
The results indicated that income was a better predictor of contributing than growth of 
government, supporting their consumption model and weakening the rent-seeking 
models.  
 Gerber’s (1999) findings about the relatively greater effectiveness of spending by 
citizen groups would receive a fuller empirical and theoretical foundation in the form of a 
2004 study of candidate elections by Stephen Coate.80 Coate’s model implied that voter’s 
evaluations of candidates are influenced by the sources of candidates’ campaign funds. 
Coate provided evidences that voters elect the high-quality candidate substantially less 
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often when his or her campaign is financed by special interests. This type of voter 
evaluation of contributor-types might provide a mechanism through which to explain the 
relative ineffectiveness of economic interest group spending observed by Gerber. 
 The question remains open as to whether the different sources of campaign 
finance have distinct impacts on voter behavior in initiative contests. In a 2005 study, 
Richard Braunstein collected spending data from all 78 ballot initiative contests during 
the the 1998 – 1992 elections in California and Colorado.81 Braunstein coded each of the 
contributors as either individuals or organizations. The author then uses descriptive 
statistics to show how donor types were distributed across the initiative contests in the 
sample. 
 To begin, Braunstein found that in 22 percent of cases, initiative issues received 
financial support from individuals greater than or equal to the amount received from 
organizations. Conversely, this means that in an overwhelming majority of cases (78%), 
initiatives received the bulk of their financing from organizational sources and not 
individual donors. Braunstein’s findings contrasted with contemporary studies of 
congressional politics which showed a majority of the money in candidate races came 
from individuals.82 Why would organizations constitute more of the contribution of 
initiative campaigns when individuals compose the majority of contributions to candidate 
campaigns? What are the normative implications of this pattern? 
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 Braunstein’s research found that organizational sources of funding composed a 
majority of contributions to both Yes committees (58%) and No committees (78%).83 
However, individuals made up over twice the percentage of contributions to Yes 
committees (31%) in comparison to No committees (15%).84 This finding reinforces 
Gerber’s conclusion that broad citizen interests are more likely to propose and support 
initiatives, whereas narrow economic interests are more likely to mount No campaigns.85 
 A third analysis in the Braunstein study examines passage rates.86 The results here 
were striking. 69.2 percent of individual contributions went into initiative contests that 
ended in passage. Conversely, 62.3% of organizational contributions went into contests 
which ended in failure. This analysis aggregates Yes and No spending into total spending 
figures. Braunstein’s findings suggests, like the earlier work on majoritarian initiative 
politics,87 that the initiative process is the site of regular victories for diffuse coalitions of 
individuals pursuing broad interests.  
 John G. Matsusaka’s 2004 book For the Many or the Few investigated whether 
the initiative process “makes policy more responsive to the will of the majority or 
increases the influence of narrow special interests.”88 Matsusaka’s empirical strategy 
involved comparing the fiscal policies of states with and without the initiative process. 
“The idea,” Matsusaka wrote, “is that however the initiative works, directly or indirectly, 
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the effect (if any) will show up in the final policies.”89 Since taxing and spending policies 
are influenced by many factors entirely independent of the initiative process, regression 
analysis was employed to isolate the effect of the initiative. The final part of Matsusaka’s 
analysis involved comparing the policy changes with the expressed opinion of the 
electorate to determine if a majority of people in each state liked or disliked the change. 
 Matsusaka focuses on the time period between 1970 and 2000 because this was a 
period in which the initiative was heavily used. According to Matsusaka, “three 
systematic effects” of the initiative process emerge from the data.90 First, the initiative 
process reduced overall spending by state and local governments. Secondly, the initiative 
process shifted spending towards local governments and away from state governments. 
And finally, the initiative process changed the manner in which funds got raised: “broad-
based taxes were cut and replaced with user fees and charges for services.”91 
 Next, Matsusaka examines whether a majority of citizens supported or opposed 
the policy changes induced by the initiatives (i.e., lower overall spending, 
decentralization, and replacing taxes with charges). Matsusaka studied numerous opinion 
polls over the thirty-year time span in question and found the evidence to be “remarkably 
consistent: a majority of people supported each of the three policy changes associated 
with the initiative.”92 Matsusaka suggests that “the most natural interpretation of the 
evidence is that the initiative allows the majority to defend itself against powerful groups 
that receive favorable treatment in the legislature.”  
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 For Matsusaka, ballot initiatives serve the policy interests of the broadly diffused 
“many” and not the narrowly concentrated “few.” In his model, the initiative process 
enables majorities to make policy without the permission or cooperation of key actors 
who control representative institutions of policymaking. None of this is to suggest that 
the initiative is a policymaking institution that is inherently predisposed to lowering and 
decentralizing spending. As evidence of this, Matsusaka performs another regression 
analysis on the early 20th century and finds that, at that earlier time, the presence of the 
initiative process was associated with high, centralized spending and taxation. The 
initiative leads to the enactment of policies that are closer to the preferences of the 
median voter, regardless of the ideological substance of said policy. 
 This paper’s review of Approach #2 demonstrated what past studies have found 
about the role that collective action problems play in structuring ballot initiative politics. 
This section began by examining the dynamics of individual and group behavior taken up 
in Mancur Olson’s work. Via Olson, groups exist to serve shared interests. Groups 
formed around narrowly concentrated and exclusive interests will find a high capacity for 
coordination and cooperation. Accordingly, group efforts to secure broadly enjoyed, 
nonexcludible collective goods will be plagued by collective action problems.  
 For over 20 years, a consensus has been accumulating that the ballot initiative 
process is characterized by a competitive advantage for broad interests. Authors have 
repeatedly identified high occurrences and high passage rates for initiative contests where 
both broad costs and broad benefits are at stake (“Majoritarian Politics”-type situations). 
Political science needs to go further in unpacking the implications of these findings. 
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 What is the exact mechanism behind a competitive advantage for broad, “citizens 
groups?” Gerber identifies it as a simple matter of a personnel advantage for broad 
citizens groups, alongside a financial advantage enjoyed by narrow business groups. Put 
simply: manpower held more purchase in the initiative process and financial power was a 
greater asset when trying to push policy change through a legislature. How does one 
know it is manpower that is making campaigns successful and not the broad benefits of 
the proposed policy that inspired the manpower to begin with? Additionally, changes in 
technology and the campaigning landscape could be changing the relative power of a 
personnel advantage, as new technology and communication breakthroughs transform the 
relevance of personnel power in a ballot initiative contest from start to finish. 
 
Approach #3: Institutionally-embedded explanations 
 The Approach #3 section of the Literature Review begins with a discussion of 
what constitutes an institutionally-embedded explanation of an initiative contest outcome. 
The section then provides background on the theoretical foundations of the initiative 
process as a policymaking institution. Studies will be examined which place initiatives 
into the context of the system of partisan attachments within the electorate which reliably 
structures voting decisions in candidate races. This section ends with a discussion of the 
importance of nonpassage goals to initiative actors and the limitation of passage models 
that exclude them. 
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Institutionally-embedded explanations 
 So far, this literature review has examined the camp of academic research on 
explaining the role of money in initiative contest outcomes, as well as another camp 
which explains outcomes in terms of the costs and benefits that an initiative offers. The 
Literature Review now concludes with a final, and, this author argues, a critical layer of 
what a satisfying passage explanation must contain. Approach #3 incorporates what the 
author calls “institutionally-embedded explanations.”  
 An institutionally-embedded explanation is any causal argument that grounds its 
microexplanations (of individual behavior) or its macroexplanations (of larger aggregated 
social phenomenon) in mesoexplanations which draw upon the roles, routines, norms, 
and identities of [‘institutions’] to build causal arguments.93 
 Microfoundational,94 microexplanations ground the pursuit of answers to “why?” 
questions in the behavior of individual goal-directed agents. Olson’s logic of free-riding 
is a form of microexplanation. Macroexplanations use a highly-aggregated level of 
individual behaviors to explain social phenomenon in terms of large social macro-factors. 
An illustrative example of a macroexplanation is Max Weber’s argument about the 
connection between Protestant values and capitalism.95 In between the two extremes lie 
mesoexplanations, wherein micro- and macroexplanations are reinforced or challenged 
by the causal powers belonging to organizations and institutions.  
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 Philosopher of social science Daniel Little argues for the significance of 
organizations and meso-level factors to social explanation. Little claims that “meso 
entities (organizations, institutions, normative systems) often have stable characteristics 
with regular behavioral consequences.” Incentives, sanctions, and supervision are 
implemented differently across different organizations. Various institutional forms may 
be more or less efficient at performing certain tasks, determining consequences for the 
people and higher-level organizations which depend on them. 
 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen provide a similar account in their 2008 piece 
written to elaborate “the ‘New Insititutionalism.’”96 The authors’ focus in the piece is on 
the elements of order and predictability that institutions can provide. The essay unpacks 
the explanatory potential of the “new” institutionalist explanations. In keeping with 
Little’s assessment, the authors observe that “the ‘new institutionalism’ avoids unfeasible 
assumptions that require too much of political actors in terms of normative 
commitments… cognitive abilities… and social control. The roles, routines, norms, and 
identities of an ‘institution,’ rather than micro-rational individuals or macro-social forces, 
are the basic units of analysis.”97 
 March and Olsen grant the complexity of the causal relation between institutional 
arrangements and substantive policy outcomes. Causal claims are usually indirect, long, 
and contingent.98 The Approach #3 section aims to demonstrate the explanatory value of 
embedding explanations of initiative passage in a larger institutional context. Doing so 
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helps to construct expectation of how initiative contest outcomes are constrained and 
enabled by political institutions, even if those institutions aren’t necessarily the 
immediate and direct cause of policy change. 
 David McCuan and Steve Stambough authored a 2005 book whose overall theme 
was an understanding of the initiative process as one among many state policymaking 
institutions, “a ‘parallel legislature,’ incumbent with the problems and challenges we see 
in the ‘sausage-making’ process… [of] legislative politics.”99 Though noting, “clear and 
compelling differences in the process associated with each arena,” the authors insisted 
that “the challenges of democratic governance are largely the same.” The authors go on 
to identify permanent features and ongoing trends in initiative politics which reproduce 
the pathologies observed in the representative institutions of policymaking. 
 This nicely sets the tone for the Approach #3 section of the literature review, 
which will examine institutionally-embedded explanations of initiative contest outcomes. 
These explanations will often speak to McCuan and Stambough’s larger question of how 
an initiative contest compares, contrasts, and interacts with the other policymaking 
institutions that surround it. Does the initiative mechanism truly “subvert the traditional 
electioneering function of the party and provide the opportunity for private (i.e., non-
party) organizations to offer advice and conduct campaigns.”100 
 Do different sorts of policy-demanding individuals and groups find success 
through the initiative process than would without it? How do ballot initiative successes fit 
into a larger understanding of legislative politics? McCuan and Stambough argued in 
                                                           
99
 McCuan and Stambough, Initiative-Centered Politics, p. 4. 
100
 Ibid, p. 60. 
  
61 
  
2005 that “we know [little] about the motivations of groups seeking to do battle through 
direct democracy when the traditional legislative process remains an avenue of 
opportunity for so many interest groups.”101 
 
Markets, governments, and institutional failures 
 Conceptually, this thesis imagines a balance of power between two classes of 
institutions: market institutions and government institutions. This view is informed by the 
insights of Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson (2009?) regarding the government’s role in 
constructing and maintaining markets.102 Theoretically, under a liberal regime, the 
presence of a policy problem indicates the presence of some market failure. The market is 
the default mechanism for allocating values in regards to the private interactions of 
autonomous individuals. Under this model, the need for government action would emerge 
from dissatisfaction with some inefficient allocation which the market generated.  
 The presence of a policy problem implies some form of market failure is 
occurring. A policy problem in its simplest form can be understood as “some unrealized 
gain or avoidable harm” connected to potential failures to satisfactorily allocate values.103 
Efficiency is not the only dimension upon which an electorate can decide the market has 
failed. Further evaluative frameworks important to voters include policy effectiveness, 
policy adequacy, normative ideological commitments, and equity of distributive 
outcomes.  
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 A system of government is created to provide for a different allocation of values 
than would otherwise exist. A democratic system takes in feedback from citizens and 
then translates that input into policy prescriptions for addressing whichever conditions 
the citizenry finds suboptimal or unacceptable. Ideally the political institutions of a 
democratic government work perfectly to translate voter preferences into value-
optimizing policy choices. But, just as the market system sometimes fails to be efficient, 
sometimes the policymaking bodies of representative government fail to validly and 
reliably embody the long-term preferences of the electorate. 
 Conceptually, this thesis approaches ballot initiatives as simultaneously 
responding to both market failures and government failures. Initiative passage/rejection 
occurs because of the reality or the perception that certain policymaking problems exist 
which representative political institutions are systemically ill-equipped to solving. 
Explaining initiative passage, on a conceptual level, compels researchers to examine the 
link between the nature of certain types of policy problems, and some feature of the 
current constellation of representative policymaking institutions. 
 Studies support the notion that the initiative process operates as an institutional 
alternative to groups that struggle to find influence in the legislature. A 1997 study by 
P.F. Heiser and M.E. Begay concluded that the critical factor behind the decisions of 
public health activists to launch an initiative was “the apparent influence of the tobacco 
industry upon the legislature.”104 Gerber found in 1998 that groups who used the 
initiative process consistently identified among their primary motivations the failure of 
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the legislature to respond to their interest. Similarly, interviews with initiative sponsors 
have identified similar beliefs about legislative unresponsiveness among their 
motivations.105  
 A causal narrative of passage demands assumptions about ballot qualification. 
Qualification is prerequisite for passage. Are the same factors that determine qualification 
the ones which determine passage? The literature on collective action problems examined 
earlier suggests that an interest’s narrowness might benefit it more in the qualification 
stage and its breadth might benefit an initiative more in the passage phase.  
 In Anne Campbell 1997 dissertation, the author places the process into a 
policymaking process with many different stages and actors to consider. She focused on 
policy entrepreneurship and agenda-setting through the state ballot initiative process. 
Campbell built her study upon the insights of Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, who 
observed that organized interests competed for influence over public officials who 
possessed “considerable freedom to choose among the plethora of issues competing for 
attention.”106 Indeed, studies of the U.S. Congress concluded that legislators displayed 
significant control over their personal and legislative agendas.107 Campbell emphasized 
the conditions under which elected policymakers made their decisions. Via Campbell, 
policymaking emerges out of “the strategic concerns of politicians who seek to increase 
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their own visibility by promoting new issues on the agenda, but who stay away from 
issues that make lots of enemies.”108  
 The data in Campbell’s dissertation was gathered from the 26 statewide initiatives 
on Colorado ballots from 1996-1992. Of these 26 initiatives, data was only available for 
24 of the contests. Interviews were conducted with either initiative sponsors (in 22 of the 
cases) or with key campaign workers (in the other 2 cases). Campbell identifies a central 
role for the initiative process in handling “hot potato” issues and conflicts of interest 
spilling over from the legislature. Campbell’s dissertation tapped into some of the 
Approach #3 literatures most compelling explanatory strengths, providing the deeper, 
policy process-embedded explanations of ballot initiative passage so lacking from the 
Approach #1 literature. Analytically, Campbell searched for causal connections between 
initiative contest outcomes and the failure of both markets and governments.  
 The explanations found in the Approach #3 literature provides a critical feature 
missing from other explanations, being informed by the context of the policy process and 
the political institutions that structure it. These explanations share a linkage between 
ballot initiative successes and the failures of both markets and representative institutions 
of government. Now that some the more theoretical elements of institutionally-embedded 
explanation have been introduced, the following subsection will examine explanations 
embedded in understandings of political parties and the party system.  
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Political parties and party systems 
 What does academic research offer in regards to explanations of ballot initiative 
success which are informed by claims about political parties and the distribution of 
partisan attachments in the electorate? Is the ballot initiative process outside and 
independent of partisan politics in some substantive way? First, this subsection begins by 
providing some background on the nature of political parties and the dynamics of party 
systems. 
 James L. Sundquist’s 1973 book on the Dynamics of the Party System provided an 
influential and parsimonious explanation of the way political competition is structured 
and managed in a two-party system.109 For Sundquist, parties enable political 
competition, and their configuration within a party system is determined by their ability 
to resist destructive and degenerative pressures generated by internal competition and 
issue proliferation. These are that pressures that tear party-coalitions apart.  
 Via Sundquist, a party’s only hope of survival lies in its capacity to manage the 
changing requirements of assembling electoral majorities. Changing political conditions 
require parties to absorb internally-divisive new issues as they emerge. Sundquist 
analyzed recurrent patterns and critical junctures that he claimed structure the rise and 
fall of parties and party systems. 
 Sundquist defines a party system as the distribution of basic party loyalties and 
attachments. He began his theory of parties in the style of a deontological thought 
experiment, inviting readers to hypothesize about an “undifferentiated… classless, 
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partyless, ungrouped, atomized society.”110 Suddenly a policymaking controversy 
emerges that splits the electorate in two. “The undifferentiated society suddenly 
differentiates.” A single line of party cleavage is all that organizes the ideological space 
in which voters form their attachments.  
 Next in Sundquist’s model, another issue comes along that divides the electorate 
along a separate, second dimension of party cleavage. These “cross-cutting, party-
splitting issue[s]” are the undoing of party systems. Sundquist posits a set of requirements 
created by the logic of party survival and party system management. How do these 
requirements affect the process by which initiative contest outcomes are generated? Via 
Sundquist, competition between parties rests on building dependable electoral coalitions 
across a highly differentiated body of policy-demanders who decide elections in each 
state. The emergence of new issues leads to changes in the basis of political competition 
which can, in turn, cause changes in the electoral fortunes of either party. Parties benefit 
from an ability to absorb new, potentially disruptive lines of party cleavage before they 
lead to an electorally undesirable conflict displacement.  
 One major implication of Sundquist’s logic is that electoral representatives have 
the opportunity and incentive to control the basis of political competition, and by 
extension the substance of policy disputes. This implies that the initiative process could 
be at time both helpful and harmful to the interests of parties themselves. If an initiative 
helps settle some internally divisive issue that threatened the party, the effect is positive. 
But if the initiative contest increases the salience of some cross-cutting issue, the effect is 
to divide the electorate in a way that is disadvantageous to the party’s electoral fortunes. 
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 In contrast to theories of political parties centered on the preferences and 
behaviors of election-minded politicians, a recent “group-centric” study of political 
parties recast policy-demanding interest groups and activists as the key actors.111 “Groups 
of organized policy demanders are the basic units of [the] theory of parties” put forth in 
the 2012 article by Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, 
and John Zaller.112 Bawn et al. make note of the normative implications, wherein their 
activist- and interest group-dominated, policy demander-oriented party theory is expected 
to be less responsive to voter preferences than a party controlled by election-driven 
politicians. 
 The nomination stage of candidate races is the primary arena where Bawn et al. 
point to illustrate the group-centric nature of parties and the implications for 
policymaking. “Nominations,” Bawn et al. claim, “are a natural focus of interest groups 
and activists.”113 Controlling nominations is more effective than lobbying because it 
helps policy-demanders overcome principal-agent problems between themselves and 
incumbents. Moreover, the authors write that “the advantageous position of groups at the 
nomination stage is bolstered by lack of voter interest… The costs of providing selected 
politicians with what they need to win a primary election are often small.” 
 In a break with an old paradigm of candidate-centered parties, Bawn et al. 
conceived of parties as the creatures of policy-demanding interest groups and activists. If 
one accepts this shift in our understanding of parties, the relationship then changes 
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between political parties and ballot initiatives. If candidate-driven parties are often in an 
adversarial stance to initiative entrepreneurs, the group-centric conception of political 
parties implies a cozier, more complementary relationship between party and ballot 
initiative politics. 
 When the ballot initiative was introduced to the states at the beginning of the 20th 
century, the Progressive and Populist reformers sought targets beyond the moneyed 
interests thought to hold undue sway over elected officials. Reformers also targeted the 
political parties and party bosses who controlled state governments.114 For the most part, 
American ballot initiative contests tend to be initiated and financed by groups falling 
beyond the reaches of parties. Research has examined how truly separate the lawmaking 
processes managed by parties actually are from the ballot-box lawmaking of the initiative 
process. Writing in 2001, Daniel A. Smith and Carline J. Tolbert argued that state and 
national parties were increasingly becoming involved in the initiative process. 
 Smith and Tolbert identified three main “motivating factors” for increasing party 
involvement in initiative contests. First, parties may become involved to promote turnout 
for the parties’ own candidates. Second, parties may engage in initiative politics to drive 
issue wedges into an opposing party’s electoral coalition. And thirdly, a party might take 
a role in initiative contests whose outcome engages them ideologically.115 
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 Tolbert and Smith claimed that “it is becoming evident that initiatives are not 
‘beyond party politics’” as other scholars claimed.116 The authors’ research design 
employs both aggregate data of counties and survey data of individuals. The aggregate 
data measures the impact of party on county-level voting for California initiatives. 
County-level voting patterns were analyzed “for the 13 statewide ballot initiatives 
appearing on the June 1998 primary and November 1998 general election ballots in 
California.”117 Their design measured whether support for the ballot initiatives was 
related to a county’s party composition, as measure in percentage of registered 
Republicans. This aggregate analysis controls for two competing explanations for policy 
adoption: prevailing economic conditions and racial/ethnic diversity.118 
 Smith and Tolbert’s survey data are used to measure the importance of political 
party affiliation to a series of initiative and candidate votes in the 1994 and 1996 
California general election. Data came from Voter News Service Exit Poll of California 
voters. Separate logistic regression models are used to model voter support for several 
ballot initiatives. Additionally, by analyzing voting in two consecutive elections, the 
authors provide evidence of the impact of party affiliation over time. 
 The aggregate, county-level analysis showed that party affiliation was associated 
with the vote for 77 percent of the initiatives appearing on the 1998 California ballots, 
even when controlling for the competing explanations. This was a positive and 
statistically significant relationship. Additionally, the survey data of individual voters 
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provided further evidence of the ways parties had become entangled in initiative politics. 
In their analysis of the surveys, Smith and Tolbert conclude that the single most salient 
predictor of voting behavior in initiative contests was party affiliation. 
 Earlier in the Approach #2 section of this literature review, Elizabeth Gerber’s 
1999 book on ballot initiative politics was examined.119 Gerber’s work has footing in 
both Approaches #2 and #3. While focusing on the distribution of costs-and-benefits that 
an initiative engages, Gerber’s analysis always remains footed in the relevant institutional 
realities. Via Gerber, broad-based groups promoting “citizens interests” enjoy a 
comparative advantage in the initiative arena. On the other hand, concentrated “economic 
interests” are generally better positioned to benefit from legislative logrolling to enjoy 
targeted benefits through compromise, as well as being equipped to use the vetogates in 
the legislature to block proposals they oppose.120  
 Gerber’s initiative process is not the site of interest groups circumventing 
legislatures. Instead, Gerber’s initiative process is a site where broad groups can keep 
narrow groups in check. A concentrated interest would prefer to lobby for policy changes 
that gain fast traction with elected officials and remain noncontroversial within the 
electorate.  The initiative process is a site where voters can overcome the inherent 
limitations that they face as they attempt to express their preferences on a broad and 
multidimensional range of issues through a single vote. 
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 In a paper from 2000 by Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, the authors 
examined the potential for “Issue Unbundling via Citizens’ Initiatives.”121 In an analysis 
informed by public choice theory, the authors argue that, in a representative democracy, 
“the bundling of issues together with the fact that citizens only have one vote, means that 
policy outcomes on specific issues may diverge far from what the majority of citizens 
wants.” When this occurs, the viability of the initiative process “permits the unbundling 
of these issues, which forces a closer relationship between policy outcomes and popular 
preferences.”122  
 The normative question of whether or not issue unbundling is socially desirable is 
packed with Madisonian implications. Does the initiative process blast through 
ideological gridlock, or thwart compromises that should be left to elected representatives. 
Besley and Coate’s analysis does not attempt to answer these normative questions, but 
does provide evidence that the initiative process allows for the unbundling of issues, 
permitting citizens to evaluate candidates on a more refined set of issues than is available 
in its absence. In the sample observed by Besley and Coate, the initiative process helped 
remove some elements of fiscal policymaking from the domain of elected politics.  
 Most importantly, what are the consequences of “issue unbundling” for political 
parties and the balance of the party system? 
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Success beyond passage 
 The explanations of initiative contest outcomes that have been examined up until 
this point in the Literature Review have all defined ballot initiative success/failure in 
terms of passage/defeat. A lot of explanatory value has been derived from assuming that 
policy-demanding individuals and groups contest ballot initiative outcomes in terms of 
passage/rejection. However, this final subsection will demonstrate the explanatory 
implications of the possibility that policy-demanders engage in initiative contests in 
pursuit of goals besides direct passage or rejection of initiatives. 
 Do policy-demanding individuals and groups define their objectives (success) in 
dimensions beyond passage/defeat? How does an expanded definition of success affect 
the explanation of passage? From the policy analysis literature, Alan McConnell wrote a 
2010 article which put forth a multi-dimensional frame for understanding policy success 
and failures. Via McConnell, policy success/failure exists along three dimensions: 
processes, programs, and politics. McConnell drew distinctions between different forms 
and degrees of policy success and failure. McConnell identifies tensions between 
different forms of success “including what is known colloquially as good politics but bad 
policy.”123 
 Process is McConnell’s first dimension of policy success. Process success 
preserves government policy goals and instruments. Program success evaluates the “basic 
resources and tools of government.”124 Lastly, political success is determined by how 
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favorably policymakers can manage their electoral prospects and enhance their 
reputations. 
 McConnell’s analytic frame could easily and fruitfully be transferred to the 
context of initiative process policymaking. In relation to McConnell’s 3 “realms” of 
policy success/failure, the initiative arena’s version of process success is the mobilization 
of groups and the establishment and maintenance of issue network infrastructure which 
helps to “build sustainable coalitions.”125 Program success relates to the passage/defeat 
dimension of contest outcomes that is the main focus of this thesis.  
 Political success is a realm that often overlaps with the other two. In initiative 
contest outcomes, political success relates to how officeholders and partisan interests are 
affected by the initiative process. The political dimension of initiative contests concerns 
whether outcomes change the basic structure of political competition or enhances the 
prospects of particular parties and candidates. 
 It seems probable that, if these nonpassage dimensions are significant, then 
explaining passage might require understanding them and their properties. Explaining the 
behavior of policy-demanders in the initiative arena will be distorted if one operates 
under the assumption that passage is the exclusive goal of actors. 
 A large number of gay marriage bans passed through statewide initiatives in the 
early 21st century. The gay marriage ban initiatives achieved near universal program 
success, but about a decade down the road, these initiative efforts appear to have resulted 
in process and political failures for their proponents. While racking up program victories 
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they allowed latent interests to become activated. Media attention focused on the 
initiative contests in a way that changed voter sentiment as well. 
 Or, conversely, take the many tax revolt initiative campaigns in the wake of 
California’s Proposition 13 (1978). Most of them failed, but their program failures are 
forgotten while their effects on California’s politics and political process persist to this 
day. A conclusion of this literature review is that explanations of formal passage and 
rejection can only tell part of the story of initiative politics. Yet on the other hand, the 
thesis holds that majority-dependent passage is the central organizing feature of ballot 
initiative politics. 
 The initiative sponsor interviews conducted for Campbell’s 1997 dissertation 
speak to the question of how nonpassage objectives fit into the strategic behavior 
initiative actors.  Campbell’s findings indicated that passage was the primary goal of Yes 
actors. In all but 2 of the 24 initiative campaigns whose sponsors or key staff were 
interviewed, the respondents “indicated that at the outset of the campaign they believed 
that their initiatives would be approved by the public.”126 Campbell quoted one sponsor 
as responding, “Sure, why else do it?” The policy entrepreneurs who pulled the trigger on 
initiative contests overwhelmingly identified passage as the primary objective of their 
efforts. 
 Nonpassage objectives of initiative actors merit consideration, but it must be kept 
in mind that the perceived likelihood of passage manages the decision-making of all 
actors throughout the initiative process. Passage potential is apparently a decisive 
threshold for the decision-making of initiatives which land qualification. However, 
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research needs to be expanded to unpack the dynamics of the initiative qualification 
process. What kinds of initiative projects get attempted and fail to qualify for ballot 
access? What characteristics distinguish successful qualification efforts from failures? 
These questions may prove to be even more revealing in explaining initiative contest 
outcomes than explaining processes that occurs further along in the sequences of events 
that starts with the petition and ends at the ballot box. 
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– Chapter 2 – 
Methods 
 
 
 
 The Methods chapter of this thesis paper is structured in the same manner as the 
review of the literature. Three designs will speak to the three approaches to explaining 
initiative contest outcomes. Design #1 will mirror Approach #1 by examining campaign 
expenditures in initiative contests. Design #2 will speak to Approach #2 by applying the 
Wilson typology of cost-benefit distribution to a sample of California and Oregon 
initiatives. Finally, Approach #3 comes through in Design #3, which examines how party 
affiliation corresponds to county-level voting patterns on a number of recent Oregon 
initiative contests. 
 
Design #1: Picking losers? The strategic financing of initiative campaigns 
 The Literature Review’s section on Approach  #1 detailed studies which 
examined the explanatory properties of campaign spending in relation to initiative contest 
outcomes. Prominent in the analysis were recent studies which claim that the endogenous 
relationship between campaign resources and passage potential has distorted past 
estimations of the effectiveness of those resources when they are manifested in the form 
of campaigns spending. Authors find inspiration in congressional literature that 
demonstrates how contributions in candidate races go to “picking winners.” Thomas 
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Stratmann wrote in 2005 wrote, “One of the most robust findings in the literature is that 
money flows to incumbents in close races.”127 
Donors may simply be heaping funds on those who will win anyway, 
perhaps because they wish to influence the members once in office.  We 
posit that campaign spending, especially money that goes to support 
initiatives, is also endogenous to their electoral chances but in just the 
opposite way. Money may flow to initiatives that are in danger of failing. 
Since contributors cannot hope to buy influence over the unchanging 
language of a ballot measure, there is no reason to pile money on one that 
is already headed for passage. Yet if an initiative looks vulnerable, its 
supporters – especially those who have already invested substantial sums 
to qualify it for the ballot – may contribute large amounts to campaign for 
its survival. If this story is correct, consider its implications for the 
conventional econometric approach.128 
 
This design will interrogate whether campaign spending in initiative contests appears to 
be targeted toward the most competitive races. Are initiative campaign financers 
systemically picking losers as recent literature claims? 
 
Data 
 The data for the analysis under Design #1 came from three western states: 
California, Oregon, and Washington. A total of 49 general election initiative contests are 
examined which took place between 2012 and 2004. This author conducted an exhaustive 
search for all reasonably rigorous opinion polls conducted in advance of initiative 
contests. Regrettably, opinion polling was not available for all initiative contests within 
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the time period. Moreover, opinion polling data was by far the most robust for California 
contests. A total of 205 opinion polls were collects for the 49 contests. This makes for an 
average of 4.2 opinion polls per initiative contest. 
 The polls were collected from newspapers, think tanks, universities, interest 
groups, and private polling firms.
setting, and resources of the surveyor. Polls were only included which indicated 
percentage in terms of the stated intentions of “likely voters” who were given an option 
to indicate “undecided” or “no opinion.”
 A five-point scale, shown below in Figure 3.1.1, represents the competitiveness of 
initiative contests as registered in opinion polling. 
 
FIGURE 3.1.1: 5-point competitive dynamic scale for initiative contests
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 Type 3 polls indicate the most competitive races. If a poll’s “Yes minus No” 
differential is not within the margin of error, then it is within a striking distance where the 
difference likely appears to be changeable with marginal campaign expenditures. 
Strategically speaking, Type 3 polls should indicate a situation where Yes actors have 
especial incentive to spend. However, the same holds true for No actors who find 
themselves competing in Type 3 contests. 
 Type 1 polls indicate that passage is very likely for a given initiative. The 
assumption of many recent studies is that Type 1 polls represent a situation where Yes 
actors have a strong disincentive to expend resources.  Type 2 polls, falling between 
Types 2 polls represent situations in which passage is deemed more likely than in Type 3 
but less likely than in Type 1.Type 4 polls are still somewhat competitive, but the 
initiative’s odds of passage are trending slightly downwards. Type 5 polls indicate an 
initiative is very likely to be defeated. Classification of polls by type was performed 
using the following procedure: 
- STEP 1: The first cut of classification involved automatically including in Type 1 
all polls which registered 50% or more of respondents as indicating an intention 
to vote Yes. 
- STEP 2: Any poll where 50% or more of voters intend to vote No is typed as a 5. 
- STEP 3: Any poll where the “Yes minus No” differential is greater than -10 and 
less than 10 is grouped into Type 3 (tight races). This rule supersedes Steps 1 and 
2, though in practices it was extremely rare for a poll to indicate over 50 percent 
for either sider without also cranking out a “Yes minus No” differential outside of 
Step 3’s purviews. 
- STEP 4: All polls with a “Yes minus No” differential between 15 and 10 are 
classified as Type 2. 
- STEP 4: All polls with a “Yes minus No” differential -15 and -10 are classified as 
Type 4. 
 
 Once each opinion poll had been individually typed, each initiative was grouped 
with its respective polling type measurements and assigned a Median Polling Type. In the 
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rare instance (once) when necessary, decisions were made between irregular even 
numbered steps which served an assumption that races were more, rather than less 
competitive. This assumption came from the deduction that the lack of an emergent mode 
indicates some manifestation of contestation within the situation. 
 
Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics and graphing are employed in the Findings chapter to 
illustrate the distribution of polling by type, both in terms of total polling and median 
polling types. To test the effectiveness of median polling types as an indicator of an 
initiative contest’s demonstrable probability of occurring, data was collected on the 
outcome of every contest both in terms of vote share and passage/defeat.  
 Descriptive statistics and correlational techniques will illustrate the strength of 
median polling type as a demonstrable indicator of an initiative’s likelihood of passage, 
available to all engaged citizens and policy-demanders in the run-up to each election. 
This will speak to the validity of Median Polling Type as a demonstrable measure of the 
competitive dynamic of a race. Data on initiative voting was collected from the 
Secretaries of State’s offices for California, Oregon, and Washington.130 
 At this point campaign finance report data on campaign expenditures is folded 
into the analysis. Data was, once again, collected from the respective Secretary of State’s 
                                                           
130
 California Secretary of State website, “Statewide Elections: 2012-1990,” California Secretary of State; 
Oregon Secretary of State website, “Election History Archive,” Oregon Secretary of State; Washington 
State Secretary of State website, “Elections & Voting: Research & Past Results,” Washington State 
Secretary of State.  
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offices for California, Oregon, and Washington.131 Campaign spending was measured as 
all reported campaign expenditures by committees registered to advocate in initiative 
contests.  
 Expenditures were only counted which occurred in the same year as the election. 
This was done to avoid underestimating the influence of marginal Yes spending by 
excluding many of the fixed costs of getting initiative’s qualified. It also allows for 
policy-demanding individuals and groups to learn about the dynamics of contests and the 
potential costs or benefits of different outcomes. When possible, in-kind contributions 
were included along with hard expenditures. 
 Measurements of campaign “spending strength” were also constructed to permit 
for cross-state analysis. A spending strength score for a Yes campaign from California is 
the mean Yes spending for all California campaigns divided by the mean spending for 
that specific Yes or No spending effort.  
Example:    
- California (2008) Proposition 8 Yes campaign expenditures equaled 
$41,707,000. 
- Then, California mean Yes campaign spending equaled $16,355,000. 
- So, divide California (2008) Prop. 8 Yes spending ($41.7 million) by the 
mean Yes spending ($16.35 million) and this creates the “spending 
strength” of Prop. 8 Yes campaigns (2.55). 
 
The following are hypotheses for Design #2. 
 
- Hypothesis #1.1: Mean Yes spending strength will be lowest in the situations 
which lean towards passage, and highest in the situations which lean towards 
failure. 
- Hypothesis #1.2: Mean No spending strength will be highest in the situations that 
are the most competitive.  
                                                           
131
 California Secretary of State website, “Cal-Access Database,” California Secretary of State; Oregon 
Secretary of State website, “ORESTAR Database,” Oregon Secretary of State; Washington State Public 
Disclosure Commission website, “Search the Database,” Washington State Public Disclosure Commission. 
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Design #2: Wilson typing and initiative contest outcomes 
 The typology employed in this design sorts initiative contests based on the 
substance of the policy at stake in each contest, whether the costs and benefits of 
proposed initiatives were concentrated narrowly within certain groups or diffused broadly 
across society. The typology is repurposed from James Q. Wilson’s The Politics of 
Regulation.132 
 In explaining the political origins of regulatory policies and administrative 
agencies, Wilson created and employed the typology that now promises to help organize 
the world of ballot initiatives. Wilson wrote:  
Elsewhere I have suggested that policy proposals, especially those 
involving economic stakes, can be classified in terms of the perceived 
distribution of costs and benefits. These costs and benefits can be 
monetary and nonmonetary, and the value assigned to them, as well as 
beliefs about the likelihood of their materializing, can change… The 
political significance of these costs and benefits arises out of their 
distribution as well as their magnitude… [, they] may be widely 
distributed or narrowly concentrated.133 
 
Wilson’s typology is illustrated below in Figure 3.2.1. 
 
                                                           
132
 Wilson, The Politics of Regulation. 
133
 Ibid., 366-367. 
  
FIGURE 3.2.1: “A Simple Classificiation of Initiative Contests” using the 
Wilson typology134 
 
 
 Interest-group politics
benefits of a policy are narrowly distributed. Often this involves two competing 
interest groups contesting a regulation. When costs and benefits are broadly 
distributed, this situation is referred to as
politics involve situations where “all or most of society expect to gain” and “all or 
most of society expects to pay.”
                                                          
134
 Donovan et al., Contending Players and Strategies,
135
 Ibid, 367. 
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 refers to a situation where the perceived costs and 
 majoritarian politics. Majoritarian 
135
 Narrowness of costs and benefits helps groups 
 p.84. 
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overcome collective action problems. For this reason, one generally expects to 
find better organization and funding for narrow causes than for broad ones. 
 When benefits are narrow and costs are widely distributed, Wilson calls 
this a situation of client politics.136 A small group expects a big benefit and 
therefore has a strong incentive to organize and act in order to bring the policy 
about. The costs are spread so thin across the population that the broad masses 
have little incentive to oppose in an organized way. Finally, when a policy 
promises general benefits at the expense of a small segment of the population, 
Wilson labels this a situation of entrepreneurial politics. An energetic 
entrepreneur can mobilize a general interest against a narrow one and thereby 
overcome the public’s collective action problem. Wilson characterizes the 
entrepreneur as “mobilizing latent public sentiment” and “associat[ing] the 
legislation with widely shared public values.”137 
 
Content analysis 
 How can narrowness and broadness be defined? Wilson’s typology is 
interested in the cost-benefit distribution in terms of “political significance.”138 
Political significance is defined through the “perceived distribution [and 
magnitude] of costs and benefits… and the value assigned to them.” In situations 
where the stakes are nakedly financial, the distinction can be made in a fairly 
straightforward way. When the policies impose direct financial costs on one 
                                                           
136
 Ibid., 369. 
137
 Ibid., 370. 
138
 Ibid., 366-367. 
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group, the quantification comes baked into the policy proposal. The narrow-broad 
distinction is easiest to make in these situations that give us a quantitative head-
start. “X% tax on a tobacco company,” or “$X billion used to fund stem cell 
research,” or “new X% tax on anyone making X amount of income” – all are 
predisposed for this sort of sorting scheme.  
 However when we turn to contests about marijuana policy, abortion rights, 
eminent domain, and gay rights, it becomes much more ambiguous and arbitrary 
to classify initiative contests in this manner. Then, more to the point, even in 
those cases which at first appeared easy to quantify, their social, nonmaterial 
dimensions emerge upon closer analysis and confound attempts at simple 
classification.  
 So how could one go about measuring the narrowness or broadness of interests in 
contests which engage nonmonetary value conflicts? One method might be to examine 
the individual contributions. If an initiative campaign has a small number of large 
contributors, it would suggest a group motivated to gain a narrow benefit or avoid a 
narrow cost. Conversely, if an initiative campaign has a large number of people 
contributing small sums, it could be indicative of a group motivated to gain a broadly 
distributed benefit or avoid a broadly distributed loss.  
 The Wilson type coding that follows incorporates campaign contribution data to 
supplement the content analysis with data on the concentration or diffusion of 
contributions. In this way, the design of the typing reverses backwards from contribution 
data as an indicator of felt stake in an outcome. 
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Data 
 Data was collected from 91 initiative contests between 2000 and 2012 in 
California, Oregon, and Washington. Using analysis of contribution data, ballot language, 
newspaper archives, and official voter information pamphlets, this author coded the 
initiatives into their respective Wilson types based on the distribution of costs and 
benefits that was understood to be at stake at the time of an initiative contest. Contests 
found difficult to code were collected and then coded independently by several other 
graduate students. This multiple coder design for the thornier classification problems was 
done to build intercoder reliability into the research design.139 
 Borrowing from the coding scheme of Anne Campbell, classification considers 
initiative impacts in terms of “economic, political, and/or social costs and benefits.”140 
First, analysis is conducted upon how different Wilson types are distributed within the 
sample. Which types are most and least prevalent? Then, the results will show the 
distribution of passage rates within this Wilson-typed sample.141 In a similar 
configuration, the mean Yes vote for the Wilson-typed sample will be calculated.142 In 
Design #1, spending strength scores were calculated for Yes and No campaigns to enable 
cross-state analysis. At this point, Design #2 deploys the same technique. Mean spending 
strength for both Yes and No campaigns is calculated using the Wilson-typed sample. The 
distributions will be presented in quadrant form. 
                                                           
139
 This technique mimics David McCuan’s in “Can’t Buy Me Love,” pgs. 52-58.  
140
 Campbell, “The Citizen’s Initiative and Entrepreneurial Politics,” p.8. 
141
 California Secretary of State website, “Statewide Elections: 2012-1990,” California Secretary of State; 
Oregon Secretary of State website, “Election History Archive,” Oregon Secretary of State.  
142
 Ibid. 
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 The following are hypotheses for Design #2. 
- Hypothesis #2.1: Spending strength of both Yes and No campaigns will be lowest 
in Majoritarian Politics situations and highest in Interest Group politics situations. 
- Hypothesis #2.2: Spending strength will higher in situations which serve narrow 
interests (Interest Group and Client Politics). 
- Hypothesis #2.3: Spending strength will be lower in situations which serve broad 
interests (Entrepreneurial and Majoritarian Politics). 
- Hypothesis #2.4: Passage rates will be highest in Majoritarian Politics situations 
and lowest in Interest Group politics situations. 
- Hypothesis #2.5: Passage rates will lower in situations which serve narrow 
interests (Interest Group and Client Politics). 
- Hypothesis #2.6: Passage rates will be higher in situations which serve broad 
interests (Entrepreneurial and Majoritarian Politics). 
 
 
Design #3: Behind party lines? 
 Design #3 looks at initiative voting in the context of the system of party 
attachments within the electorate. Design #3 is constructed to align with Approach #3’s 
emphasis on institutionally-embedded understandings of imitative contests and their 
outcomes.  Do, as early advocates hoped, ballot initiatives function as a mechanism to 
carve out a policymaking arena outside of party control? How insulated is the initiative 
process from the influence of party-organized institutions that coexist alongside it. 
 Design #3 examines how initiative politics and voting sometimes do and 
sometimes do not occur along party-based lines. Data was collected on 14 Oregon 
initiative contests between 2006 and 2000. Data was collected on the county-level, with 
the Yes vote percentage of each county collected for each initiative contest. 
 A measure of county-level attachment towards the Democratic party was created 
using the percentage vote for Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry in the 2004 
presidential election. Correlational coefficients were calculated for each contest between 
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county-level Yes voting and county-level Democratic attachment. Analysis is then 
performed that links the content of initiatives to the respective correlation between Yes 
voting and Democratic affiliation. Because of the two-party nature of American politics, 
the Republican Party affiliation score can largely be inferred to be the inverse of the 
Democratic affiliation value.  
 The following are hypotheses for Design #3. 
- Hypothesis #3.1: Correlation between a county-level Yes voting and county-level 
party attachment will range between very high and moderately less high. 
- Hypothesis #3.2: In some observations, voting on initiatives will be strongly, 
positively correlated to county party affiliation, but in other observations it will be 
strongly, negatively associated 
 
 
 Associations between county-level initiative voting and party attachment will be 
measured in terms of a Pearson product-moment coefficient between county-level Yes 
voting and county-level Democratic Party affiliation. Hypothesis #3.1 will require 
examination of the distribution of correlations by absolute value within the 14-contest 
universe of the sample. 
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– Chapter 4 – 
Findings 
 
 
 
 This chapter contains the findings of the data analyses projects laid out in the 
previous chapter, Methods. The subsections will correspond to the three approaches to 
explaining passage that have structured this research paper so far. 
 
Design #1: Picking losers? The strategic financing of initiative campaigns 
 The findings for Design #1 begin with the distribution of polling types that 
emerged from a universe of 205 opinion polls conducted in California, Oregon, and 
Washington between 2012 and 2004. Classification procedures for poll typing can be 
found in the previous chapter. Figures 4.1.1 illustrates the distribution of polls in the 
sample as they correspond to the 5-point competitiveness typology
 
FIGURE 4.1.1: Distribution of initiative opinion polls by type 
 
 
 The distribution is double-peaked with the most occurrences of polls typed as 1s 
and 3s. The most frequent poll type, Type 3, indicated the most competitive contests. The 
  
second most frequent poll type, Type 1, indicated the most 
Polls in the sample of 205 were highly likely 
advantages. 
 In order to examine the 5
categories are condensed in figure 4.1.2. Po
another to form the LEANS PASSAGE category. Accordingly, categories 4 and 5 are 
collapsed into one another to form the LEANS DEFEAT category. 
FIGURE 4.1.2: Distribution of polls by condensed competitive typing
 
 
 The new categories even the data out, clarifying some of the trends first made 
visible in Figure 4.1.1. LEANS PASSAGE and TIGHT RACE poll were each twice as 
frequent as LEANS DEFEAT polls. These condensed categories will be deployed 
throughout the analysis as an 
system. 
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Yes-advantaged situations. 
to indicate either tight races or heavy 
-point competitiveness typology a bit further, the 
ll types 1 and 2 were collapsed into one 
alternative way of looking at the 5-point competitiveness 
 
Yes 
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 The next step involved creating a Median Poll Type specific to each initiative 
contest. The Median Poll Type was intended to capture demonstrable evidence of how 
competitive contests were and in what direction the odds appear to be stacked in during 
the year of the election. The distribution of Median Poll Type among the contests is 
depicted in Figure 4.1.3. 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1.3: Distribution of competitive dynamic types within a sample of 
initiative contests 
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FIGURE 4.1.4: Distribution of occurrences of initiative contests within the 
condensed competitive dynamic categories 
 
 
 At this stage, data is integrated into the findings which relates to passage and the 
vote share of initiative outcomes. Obviously, vote share ultimately decides the passage or 
defeat of initiatives. Vote share and passage are the dependent variables which are 
necessarily engaged when explaining initiative contest outcomes. Data on mean vote 
share and passage percentage are displayed for each initiative type. Table 2 illustrates 
how success was distributed among contests within the 5-type universe. This part of the 
analysis speaks to the effectiveness of polling data and classification procedures for 
predicting initiative outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
MEDIAN POLL TYPE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
TABLE 2: Mean Yes vote percentage, by contest type
 
 
 Mean Yes voting was distinctly higher (56%) in Type 1 contests. The numbers 
steadily decline. By Type 5 contests, those indicating the lowest probability of passage, 
mean Yes voting has declined to 29.8%.
FIGURE 4.1.5: Passage rate distribution across contest types
 
 
Strikingly, 76.5 percent of all Type 1 initiative contests resulted in passage.
contests were over twice as likely to end in passage as the average c
Overall, this data shows that if an initiative contest was in Types 2
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MEAN YES VOTE % 
56.4 
46 
43.7 
43.8 
29.8 
 
  
 
ontest in the data set. 
-5, it was unlikely to 
 
 
 Type 1 
  
pass on average. However, the probability was high that a Type 
end in passage. 
 
FIGURE 4.1.6: Distribution of passage rates across condensed categories of 
competitive dynamic 
 
 Passage rates are also revealing for the condensed categories. These are displayed 
above in Figure 4.1.6. The pas
higher than any other condensed category, suggesting the stability of polls as an indicator 
if a contest’s outcome competitiveness. 
 Measures of campaign “spending strength” were constructed 
of spending constant to the size of the state in which it occurred. This was done in order 
to facilitate cross-state analysis of spending. In Figure 4.1.
measures are deployed in 
condensed categories. 
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1 initiative contest would 
sage rate for passage-leaning contests was over three times 
 
which held the level 
7, these “spending str
a comparison of mean Yes spending strength across the 3 
 
 
ength” 
  
FIGURE 4.1.7: Mean Yes
condensed competitive dynamic categories
 
 
 The Yes spending strength is greatest in contests which lean towards defeat. 
campaigns spent the least
relationship was not as distinct as the relationship between condensed categories and 
spending strength. In sum, the strategic financing demonstrated by the data in Figure 
4.1.7 would distort estimates of the effectiveness of 
zero. 
 Figure 4.1.8 contains 
the 3 condensed competitiveness categories. 
strongest in tight races and weakest in those situation which lean towards passage.
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 spending strength of initiative contests typed into 
 
 strongly when the contest leaned towards passage. The 
Yes spending downwards towards 
No campaign mean spending strength numbers, sorted by 
The results show that No money tended to be 
 
 
Yes 
No 
  
  
FIGURE 4.1.8: Mean No 
condensed competitive dynamic categories
 
 No spending is strongest in situations where the competitive dynamic suggests a 
tight race. No spending was weakest in races that were likely to 
Furthermore, No spending was, on average, twice as strong in contests that leaned 
towards defeat as it was in
that No campaigns are either unable or unwilling to put resources into contests that are
likely to win, and most likely to spend the strongest in tight
strategic financing of No 
effectiveness of No spending.
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end in passage
 contests that leaned towards passage. This provides evidence 
-races. In general this 
campaigns would cause researchers to overestimate the 
 
 
. 
 
  
 
Design #2: Wilson typing 
 Below, Figure 4.2.1 contains a representation of how contest types were 
distributed within the dataset. 
 
FIGURE 4.2.1: Wilson types 
 
An unrivaled majority (55%) of the contests fall within the Majoritarian Politics category. 
The least contests occur in the Interest Group Politics category (10%). Occurrences of
initiative contestation appear to be closely correlated to the presence of broad policy 
stakes on either side of the 
 Figure 4.2.2, seen below, shows the passage rates of Wilson
Wilson typing contains a distribution of passage rates that 
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and initiative contest outcomes 
 
 
– total occurrences and percentages of sample
Yes/No divide. 
-typed contests. The 
suggests significant association 
 
 
 
  
between broad benefits and increasing passage rates. The same holds true, though sl
less so, for an association between broad costs and increasing passage rates. 
FIGURE 4.2.2: Initiative passage distribution across Wilson
 
 
 The passage rate for the entire sample was 29.7%. 
aggregated to show the passage rate for contests where broad benefits were being 
contested, the passage rate for this category is 
contests with narrow benefits (Types 1 and 2) was a meager 
rate is the highest for Majoritarian Politics
highest for Entrepreneurial Politics contests. Entrepreneurial politics contests seldom 
ended in passage (17%). Zero of the Interest Group Politics contests ended in passage.
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-typed contests
If Types 3 and 4 contests are 
37%.  Conversely, the passage rate for 
11.5. At 38% the passage 
-type situations. Passage rates were second 
 
ightly 
 
 
 
  
 The next graphic (Fig. 4.2.3) shows the distribution of mean 
Wilson-typed sample of contests. As was expected given the passage rate distribution, the 
largest mean Yes voting was solidly within the Majoritarian Politics category. 
FIGURE 4.2.3: Distribution of mean 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Politics has a very respectable 48% mean 
close second to Majoritarian Politics across this dimension. As with passage rates, a 
broad benefitting contest (Types 3 and 4) attracts the most 
 At this point in the analysis, campaign finance data is inte
initiative contest dataset of Design #2. A measure of Spending Strength for 
campaigns was constructed in order to hold initiative spending levels relative to the scope 
of campaign spending required to compete within the specif
Figure 4.2.2 shows how the spending strength of 
the 4 Wilson types. 
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Yes voting within the 
 
Yes-voting across Wilson-typed contest
Yes voting rate, making it a 
Yes voting on average. 
grated into the 91 
ic context of a given state. 
Yes campaigns was distributed across 
 
 
 
 
Yes and No 
  
FIGURE 4.2.4: Mean Yes
 
 
This distribution is very much the inverse of the earlier distributions. 
spending strength is closely and positively related to the engagement of narrow interests, 
particularly narrow benefits. Interest Group contests between narrow interests 
strongest Yes spending by far 
decisive lack of spending strength for 
 In Figure 4.2.5, the analysis turns to 
averages are presented across Wilson
situations have by far the greatest mean 
contests have, on average, over twice as much spending str
campaigns.  
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Yes campaigns. 
No spending. No campaign spending strength 
-typed contest distribution. Interest Group Politics 
No spending strength. Narrow-benefitting 
ength behind their 
 
-contests 
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have the 
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FIGURE 4.2.5: Mean No 
 
 
Overall, the results map out over the 
consistency. The least No 
Politics situation. 
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Design #3: Party Politics and the Initiative Process  
BALLOT CORRELATION BETWEEN YES  
MEASURE VOTING AND DEMOCRATIC AFFILLIATION  
9/OR/2000 -0.9417 
87/OR/2000 -0.6019 
95/OR/2000 -0.8161 
5/2000/OR 0.9289 
25/OR/2002 0.6696 
36/OR/2004 0.8861 
37/OR/2004 -0.8119 
35/OR/2004 -0.8192 
14/OR/2004 0.8291 
43/OR/2006 -0.8975 
40/OR/2006 -0.9315 
48/OR/2006 -0.5952 
42/OR/2006 -0.4489 
47/OR/2006 -0.4933 
 
Table 3: Coefficients of correlations between a county’s Yes voting on a ballot 
measure and its level of connection with the Democratic Party 
 
 
 In Table 3, seen above, the correlational coefficient is presented for each initiative 
contest between county-level Yes voting and Democratic Party attachment. Coefficients 
range from a high of 0.9289 for Oregon’s 2000 Measure 5, to a low of  -0.9417 for 
Oregon’s 2000 Measure 9. The closest any contest’s coefficient came to zero was 0.4489 
for Oregon’s 2006 Measure 42.  Six of the measures were correlated below -0.8. Three of 
the measures were correlated above 0.8. Five of the measures correlated somewhere 
between -0.8 and 0.8. 
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– Chapter 5 – 
Discussion 
 
 
 
 This chapter begins with a discussion of the results of Design #1. This author 
interprets that the data shows strategic decision-making in the financing of Yes and No 
campaigns. Policy-demanding individuals and groups gave the most money to initiatives 
that appeared in danger of going “the wrong way.” Next, the results from Design #2 are 
discussed. Evidence  will be discussed which documented a recurrent pattern wherein 
broad interest engagement is connected to weak spending values and high passage rates. 
The inverse is also true, a trend connects narrow interest engagement in contests with 
high spending levels and low passage rates.  
 Finally, the results for Design #3 will be examined. In Design #3, variation was 
observed as to whether or not initiatives relied moderately or highly on partisan-
structured coalitions to constitute their Yes vote. Additionally, considerable variation was 
also observed in regards to which side of the partisan divide initiatives built their Yes 
coalitions with. 
 This chapter then evaluates the hypotheses provided earlier in the Methods 
chapter. The hypotheses were all supported, to one degree or another, by the findings. 
This chapter then concluded with a discussion of the limitations of this study and an 
evaluation of how future research should proceed. 
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Design #1: Picking Losers? 
 This analysis was built around claims about the strategic behavior of the policy-
demanders who finance initiative campaigns. Does Yes money really tend to flow 
towards floundering initiative efforts? Does the level of campaign spending generally 
track with the competitiveness of initiative contests? 
 The testing of the typing instrument demonstrated a reasonable overlap between 
contest typing and contest outcomes. In terms of both passage rates and mean Yes voting. 
The measures of spending strength were presented in the context of condensed contest 
categories in Figures 4.1.9 and 4.1.10. The mean Yes spending strength was lowest in 
situations which leaned towards passage, and rose as the probability of defeat increased. 
Interestingly, the most dramatic association between competitiveness and mean Yes 
spending strength occurred in situations which leaned most heavily towards defeat. This 
relationship provides support for the assumption built into recent research which controls 
for a tendency of Yes money to be made available to more vulnerable initiatives. 143 
 The mean No spending strength distribution contains an even more dramatic level 
of variation. No campaigns had the strongest spending in tight races. In terms of strategic 
behavior, No-demanding actors appeared to have one tendency which ran opposite from 
Yes-demanding actors. Yes-demanding actors spent the strongest when defeat seemed the 
most likely. Their commitment to the initiative effort was stickier, and the decision to cut 
their losses when the odds changed was more difficult.  
                                                           
143
 Stratmann (2005), de Figueiredo et al. (2011) 
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 No-demanding actors spent the least when their disfavored initiatives seemed on 
course to pass. Perhaps this speaks to the No campaigns’ tendency to have an easier time 
cutting off funding to initiative efforts once evidence suggests they are futile.  
 
 
Design #2: Majoritarian initiative success on the cheap? 
 The results of Design #2 largely comport with the findings of other researchers 
who used the Wilson typology within the context of the initiative process. In keeping 
with past studies, a majority of initiative contests were found to be situations of 
Majoritarian Politics. Moreover, Entrepreneurial Politics contests covered another 16% of 
the sample. This means that 71% of the initiative contests concerned policy changes 
which would have brought broadly distributed benefits to the citizenry. Passage rates 
were highest for majoritarian initiatives. This underlines some of the normative 
implications made about the distribution of occurrences of different contest types. 
Passage rates are significantly higher for contests which benefit broad groups. 
 Mean Yes spending strength was the highest in Interest Group Politics contests. 
This corresponds with the strategic behavior expected of individuals and groups. A 
narrow group has the resources to spend strongly to support its interests. If that narrow 
group is in competition with another narrow, well-financed interest, then it makes sense 
that the spending would be the strongest. 
 Mean Yes spending strength was the lowest for Majoritarian Politics-type 
initiative contests. It was less than one third that of Interest Group Politics-type contests. 
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Once again, these findings comport with the understanding of the logic of collective 
action. Broad interests have less ability to spend strongly. In the distribution of mean Yes 
spending across the Wilson typology, Yes spending increases in concert with the 
opportunities and incentives created by the relative breadth or narrowness of interests at 
stake in initiative contests. 
 Strikingly, the Majoritarian Politics-type initiative contests had the highest 
passage rate. Taken with their relatively small Yes spending strength, this means that 
situations of majoritarian politics allowed policy-demanders to pass a relatively large 
amount of initiatives for a low amount of Yes spending. However, the pattern also holds 
true for narrow-narrow contests. Interest Group Politics-type contests had the highest 
levels of Yes spending strength, and zero passages to show for it.  
 This means that both Yes and No money were targeted towards a set of initiatives 
that were very unlikely to win in the first place. These numbers suggest an omitted 
variable that could bias estimates of the effectiveness of spending downwards towards 
zero. In terms of No spending strength, it was highest in Interest Group Politics-type 
contests as well. Also, just like Yes spending, No spending was weakest in majoritarian 
contests. Once again, the logic suggests that No  spending strength rises in concert with 
opportunity and incentive. The relationship between passage rates and estimates of 
spending efficacy cuts the opposite way. If No spending is targeted towards contests 
which are likely to fail, then a model that excludes this tendency is likely to overestimate 
the effectiveness of No spending.  
  
 The results indicate a relationship between an initiative contests Wilson types and 
1) its odds of ending in passage and 2) the probable levels of spending. In Figure 5.2.1 
below, it  has been documented how ma
situation which, excluded from one’s models, makes 
as an ingredient for passage
FIGURE 5.2.1: Relationship between majoritarian initiative contests, spending,
and passage rates 
 
 
 Figure 5.2.2, seen below, displays the other strategic situation to account for, 
where narrow actors, particularly when competing with other narrow actors, will pour 
lots of resources into contests which begin with slim initial odds 
against.  Models of the influence of money in initiative contests which turn a blind eye to 
the tendency of narrow money to “pick losers” will miss the deeper causality which 
organizes initiative politics.
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joritarian initiative contests provide a strategic 
Yes spending appear less necessary 
-seekers.  
 
of passage to work 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 5.2.2: Relationshi
and passage rates 
  
 
 
Design #3: Outside party politics?
 The findings affirm
of the initiatives in the 14
correlated at a coefficient above 0.9. Additionally, there were several initiatives that were 
negatively correlated at a coefficient below 
partisan affiliation was not related to initiative voting in any meaningful way. Though the 
proportion of this small sample reveals a tendency towards initiatives which rely on 
Democratic coalitions to turn out 
that it is not the creature of any one party for any sustained amount of time.
 Below, in Figure 5.3.1, 
Democratic party-affiliation, and county
5. Ballot Measure 5 was a gun control initiative which would have expanded the 
circumstances requiring a background check when firearms possession was transferred. 
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p between narrow-narrow initiative contests, spending, 
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Measure 5 is featured because it was the contest in the sample where county Democratic 
affiliation was correlated the strongest to Yes voting. The correlation coefficient was 
0.93.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 5.3.1: Relationship between county-level Democratic Party affiliations 
and voting on Oregon’s Ballot Measure 5 (2000) 
 
 
 In the example of Ballot Measure 5, a counties’ level of affiliation with the 
Democratic Party was highly and positively correlated with Yes voting. This gun control 
initiative was passed along almost entirely the same lines of political division as the 
presidential election that would come 4 years later. The measure apparently relied over 
90% on the same coalition of voters that favor Democratic candidates. 
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FIGURE 5.3.2: Relationship between county-level Democratic Party affiliations 
and voting on Oregon’s Ballot Measure 9 (2000) 
 
 
 The correlational coefficient was even stronger (-0.9417), though in the opposite 
direction for Ballot Measure 9. Ballot measure 9 would have prohibited public schools 
from encouraging, promoting, sanctioning, or instructing on homosexual or bisexual 
behaviors. Like Ballot Measure 5, this was a classic social issue initiative contest. Figure 
5.3.2, seen above, displays a scatterplot comparing a counties’ level of Democratic 
affiliation with its level of Yes voting on Measure 9. Democratic Party affiliation was 
strongly correlated with lower levels of Yes spending. It should be noted, that in 
comparison to Fig. 5.3.1’s scatterplot on Measure 5, the data points are clustered closer to 
the linear best fit line. This indicates more consensuses within the Democratic Party on 
how to vote on Measure 9. 
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FIGURE 5.3.3: Relationship between county-level Democratic Party affiliations 
and voting on Oregon’s Ballot Measure 42 (2006) 
 
 
 In Figure 3.3.3, seen above, a scatterplot is featured which illustrates the 
relationship between a counties’ level of Democratic affiliation and its level of Yes voting 
on Measure 42. Measure 42 was featured because it was in this correlational analysis that 
the lowest level of significance was found. The correlation coefficient was -0.4489.  
Measure 42 was an insurance regulation reform initiative. It is either an Interest Group 
Politics or a Client Politics situation initiative via the Wilson typology. It makes sense 
from a theoretical point of view that interest group politics around a low-salience issue 
would produce this sort of voting, where party affiliation seems to be a minimal factor in 
organizing behavior. However, it should be noted that the low correlation in this instance 
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is probable more a case of the poor performance of Measure 42 across all categories. The 
measure failed with a meager 35% Yes vote. 
 Overall, the small sample of 14 contests ranged from high to moderate levels of 
association between county-level initiative voting and partisan attachment. This suggests 
that, even if parties do not control initiative politics on an organizational level, partisan 
loyalties in the legislature are critical to shaping a voter’s decisions in the initiative arena. 
The findings here cast doubt on the notion that ballot initiative contests exists outside of 
party politics in some substantive way. 
 
Conclusions 
 Hypotheses #1.1 and 1.2 pertain to a tendency for spending to be made available 
in more competitive situations. Hypothesis #1.1 predicted that Yes spending would be 
weakest in contests which leaned the hardest towards passage and strongest in contests 
which leaned the most towards defeat. Figure 4.1.8 illustrates the data which affirmed 
this hypothesis. Hypothesis #1.2 predicted that the spending for No campaigns would be 
strongest in the most competitive (Type 3) situations. The findings, displayed in Figure 
4.1.9, affirmed this hypothesis.  
 Hypotheses #2.1 – 2.5 pertained to Design #2. Hypothesis #2.1 predicted which 
situations spending strength would be the highest and the lowest for Yes and No 
campaigns. The findings supported the hypotheses. Spending strength for both Yes and 
No campaigns was strongest in situations of Interest Group Politics and weakest for 
Majoritarian Politics. Furthermore, Hypothesis #2.2 and 2.3 were also confirmed by the 
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data – high spending strength was associated with narrow costs and benefits, and low 
spending strength was associated with broad costs and benefits. Hypotheses #2.4 – 2.6 
anticipated that passage rates would be associated with Wilson type in the opposite way 
as campaign spending strength. Majoritarian politics and broad interests would be 
associated with high passage rates. Narrow interests and interest group politics were 
associated with low passage rates. These hypotheses were borne out by the results of the 
analyses.  
 Hypotheses #3.1 and 3.2 were written for Design #3. The first hypothesis (#3.1) 
predicted variability in the degree of association between county-level partisan 
attachment and Yes voting on initiatives. The levels of association actually varied only 
from moderate to very high levels of correlation, with no examples of distributions that 
didn’t map at least moderately closely over the structure of partisan attachments. 
Sometimes partisan attachment maps out over the Yes voting in a manner that makes 
them look like virtually the same thing. At other times they appear to be moderately less 
determinative. In sum, the evidence here suggests that ballot initiative contests do not 
take place outside or independent of party politics in any truly substantive sense. The 
second hypothesis (#3.2) predicted variability in the directionality of association, if and 
where it did exist. This hypothesis was affirmed by the findings, wherein there were 
several highly significant associations in both directions within a relatively small sample. 
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Limitations 
 This section accounts for the limitations of the research design. First come some 
broad explanatory limitations related to generalizability, contingency, and the 
heterogeneity of variables. At this point, the section then goes through the limitations of 
each of the three research designs, beginning with Design #1 and ending with Design #3. 
 The first set of limitations pertains to generalizability. Whether dealing with 
money, breadth of interests engaged, or institutional conditions, it is difficult to generate 
evidence of specific initiatives passing and failing which can support general conclusions 
about why passage occurred when it did. Claims can hypothetically gain generalizability 
if the sample were expanded to gain more cases across more contests. However, gains in 
scope and parsimony can come with an explanatory blindness to contingency. This thesis 
looks at data from 21st century initiative contests in California, Oregon, and Washington. 
It would require caution to generalize from observations of this sample to initiative 
politics in other times and places. 
 Under Design #1, polling data was used to classify the competitive dynamic of 
initiative contests. Polling data was not available for every initiative contest. The 
initiative contests with sufficient polling data were obviously not randomly selected. It is 
probable that poling data was systemically inclined to focus dominantly on high-salience 
contests at the exclusion of more low-profile contests. This might play a role in 
explaining why so few narrow-narrow contests were observed in the sample. Sampling 
errors like these critically limit the generalizability of claims made in Design #1. 
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Generalizations based on patterns in the sample do not apply beyond high-salience 
contests.  
 Explanations of initiative contest outcomes are also limited by the contingency of 
the political environment. Many authors have observed emerging changes in the basic 
dynamics of political competition.144 Changes in initiative politics (across states, issue 
areas, and time periods) limit the transferability of any conclusions researchers can draw 
about what causes initiative contests outcomes. 
 In regards to Design #1, the survey research was not available for every initiative 
contest. Moreover, it was not distributed uniformly within the contests for which it was 
available. Therefore, whatever qualities made it more likely for an initiative to generate 
polling data, those qualities distorted any attempt to draw conclusions about the initaitve 
process in generalized terms. 
 Resources limitations constrained this study’s ability to develop and implement 
intercoder reliability procedures in Design #2 when the Wilsonian classification was 
performed. Intercoder reliability procedures could have incorporated a larger number of 
coders to better achieve their purpose. Additionally, Wilson typing is inherently laden 
with subjectivity. The analysis under Design #2 is limited by the capacity for researcher 
bias to guide classification into the four Wilson categories of cost-benefit distribution. 
 In Design #3, for simplicity’s sake, county-level partisan attachment was was 
represented in terms of John Kerry’s vote percentage in the 2004 presidential election. 
There are endless reasons why this would fail to capture Democratic attachment, from 
candidate charisma to some other particularity of that year (2004) which does not hold 
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true for the whole sample (2006 – 2000). This study’s measures of partisan attachment 
are limited by the degree to which a county’s vote for John Kerry in 2004 falls short of 
capturing its democratic attachment from 2006 to 2000. 
 
Further research 
 Future studies should look to the recurrent situations documented in Design’s #1 
and 2 to inform the econometric techniques applied to measure the influence of money.   
In regards to Approach #2, future studies should look at the relationship between Wilson 
type and the regulations surrounding the initiative. Do regulations on the initiative 
process affect what qualifies and passes in terms of distribution of Wilson types. This 
study has provided some broad evidence suggesting that the initiative process allows 
diffuse interests to overcome collective action problems. Future research should 
rigorously elaborate how the initiative process helps groups activate latent interests and 
overcome collective action problems. The conditions and mechanisms underlying this 
process must be better understood through future research. 
 Though this author has attempted some basic efforts, the normative implications 
remain to be unpacked of the tendency, observed in this study as well as others,145 for the 
initiative process to promote participation and passage for broad interests with limited 
resources. In relation to an earlier observation, future studies should unpack the 
implications of how best to regulate an initiative arena organized by “majoritarian” 
political conflicts. 
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 Additionally, Wilson typing procedures inherently lack some precision, but 
improvements could still be made by incorporating more coders and establishing more 
rigorous procedures for selecting and briefing the coders. This study incorporated this 
author’s assessment of the concentration of contributions within a measure committee’s 
records. However, future studies could supplement a content analysis of initiatives with a 
more quantitatively precise procedure for measuring the relative concentration or 
diffusion of contributions – that is to say, measuring whether an initiative committee’s 
war chest is composed of many small donations or a few huge donations. This kind of 
design would build onto the efforts of Braunstein.146 A technique such as this would build 
further reliability and validity into Wilson typing procedures through incorporating a 
measure of felt stakes in initiative outcomes. 
 Further research into explaining initiative success should embrace this study’s 
emphasis on the power of institutionally-embedded explanations. The ballot initiative 
process as an institution of policymaking needs to be better understood both in its own 
institutional terms and in the broader context of other the policymaking institutions with 
which it shares power. Future studies should examine variations in success rates between 
contests with varying degrees of alignment with partisan attachments. Multistate analyses 
should look at whether successful initiatives are more often built on non-party coalition 
or the coalitions of parties. Furthermore, multistate analyses should answer whether 
success was more often related to significant reliance on a party coalition which is 
respectively in or out of power in the statehouse. 
                                                           
146
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 Though omitted from this paper, explanations must be considered which examine 
the importance of sequencing. How do the determinants of success in the ballot initiative 
process transform in response to an election year’s cyclical status as presidential, 
midterm, or off-year? There is potential for a fascinating study which compares and 
contrasts ballot initiative politics between political cycles. The practical applications of 
such a study could be enormous if it could effectively forecast the ideal year for trying to 
pass a specific initiative. 
 Finally, future studies of the initiative process must describe nonpassage 
objectives of initiative campaigns, and explain the degree to which these objectives can 
operate independently from passage objectives to motivate initiative actors. Ballot 
initiative politics is a dynamic and under-investigated institution of policymaking. Going 
forward, explanations of ballot initiative contests must acknowledge the range of passage 
and nonpassage motivations which combine at the site of initiative politics to affect 
changes in the processes, products, and politics of democratic government.  
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– Appendix A – 
Design #1 Data 
 
 
 
 Below, in Table A.1, the data is presented for every poll under Design #1. 
Columns are provided corresponding to initiative number, state, and year, the name of the 
surveyor who conducted the poll, the date and size of the sample, the percentage who 
responded Yes, No, and “Don’t Know,” and the competitive dynamic type number 
assigned to the poll. For a small portion of the polls, data on sample size were not 
available. 
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INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
30/CA/2012 
GQR for USC Dornsife and 
LA Times 
March 13-19, 
'12 1500 64 33 3 1 
30/CA/2012 PPIC April 3-10, '12 823 54 39 7 1 
30/CA/2012 PPIC May 14-20, '12 2002 56 38 7 1 
30/CA/2012 Field Poll May 21-29, '12 710 52 35 13 1 
30/CA/2012 Field Poll 
June 21-July 2, 
'12 997 54 38 12 1 
30/CA/2012 
PACE/USC for Rossier 
School of Edu. Aug. 3-7, '12 1041 55 36 9 1 
30/CA/2012 PPIC Sept. 9-16, '12 2003 52 40 8 1 
30/CA/2012 Field Poll Sept 17-23, '12 902 51 36 13 1 
30/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept , '12 1504 54 37 9 1 
30/CA/2012 Survey USA Oct. 7-9, '12 700 33 38 29 3 
30/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 49.5 41.7 8.8 3 
30/CA/2012 Reason-Rupe Oct. 11-15, '12 696 50 46 4 3 
30/CA/2012 PPIC Oct. 14-21, '12 2006 48 44 8 3 
30/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 49.2 42.9 7.8 3 
30/CA/2012 Field Poll Oct. 17-30, '12 1912 48 38 14 2 
31/CA/2012 PPIC Sept. 9-16, '12 2003 25 42 32 5 
31/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 57.6 35.5 26.9 1 
31/CA/2012 PPIC Oct. 14-21, '12 2006 24 48 28 5 
31/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 37.8 36.8 25.5 3 
32/CA/2012 PPIC Sept. 9-16, '12 2003 42 49 9 3 
32/CA/2012 Field Poll Sept. 6-18, '12 1183 38 44 18 3 
32/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept 17-23, '12 1504 36 44 20 3 
32/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 51.4 38.3 10.3 1 
32/CA/2012 Reason-Rupe Oct. 11-15, '12 696 45 48 7 3 
32/CA/2012 PPIC Oct. 14-21, '12 2006 39 53 7 4 
32/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 44.7 44.8 10.5 3 
32/CA/2012 Field Poll Oct. 17-30, '12 1912 34 50 16 5 
33/CA/2012 PPIC Sept. 9-16, '12 2003 25 42 32 5 
33/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 37.6 35.5 26.9 3 
33/CA/2012 PPIC Oct. 14-21, '12 2006 24 48 28 5 
33/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 37.8 36.8 25.5 3 
34/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept. 17-23, '12 1503 38 51 11 4 
34/CA/2012 Survey USA Oct. 7-9, '12 700 32 48 20 5 
34/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 42.9 48.1 9 3 
34/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Oct. 15-21, '12 1504 42 45 13 3 
34/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 41.3 47.9 10.8 3 
34/CA/2012 Field Poll Oct. 17-30, '12 1912 45 38 17 3 
 
Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing 
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Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing (continued) 
 
INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
35/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 77.8 13.6 8.6 1 
35/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 76.5 13.7 9.8 1 
36/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept. 17-23, '12 1504 66 20 14 1 
36/CA/2012 Survey USA Oct. 7-9, '12 700 44 22 34 1 
36/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 72 17.1 10.9 1 
36/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Oct. 15-21, '12 1504 63 22 15 1 
36/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 67.4 22 10.6 1 
37/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept. 17-23, '12 1504 61 25 14 1 
37/CA/2012 Survey USA Oct. 7-9, '12 700 39 30 31 3 
37/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 48.3 40.2 11.5 3 
37/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 39.1 50.5 10.5 5 
38/CA/2012 Field Poll Feb. 14-28, '12 344 45 48 7 3 
38/CA/2012 
GQR for USC Dornsife 
and LA Times Mar. 14-19, '12 1500 32 64 4 5 
38/CA/2012 Field Poll May 21-29, '12 710 42 43 15 3 
38/CA/2012 Field Poll 6/21-7/2, '12 997 46 46 8 3 
38/CA/2012 
PACE/USC for Rossier 
School of Edu. Aug. 3-7, '12 1041 40 49 11 4 
38/CA/2012 PPIC Sept. 9-16, '12 2003 45 45 11 3 
38/CA/2012 Field Poll Sept. 6-18, '12 902 41 44 15 3 
38/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept. 17-23, '12 1504 34 52 14 5 
38/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 7-10, '12 830 41.9 45.9 12.2 3 
38/CA/2012 Reason-Rupe Oct. 11-15, '12 696 42 52 6 5 
38/CA/2012 PPIC Oct. 14-21, '12 2006 39 53 8 5 
38/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 17-30, '12 2115 33 54.1 12.8 5 
38/CA/2012 Field Poll 6/21-7/2, '12 1912 34 49 17 5 
39/CA/2012 Field Poll 6/21-7/2, '12 997 44 43 13 3 
39/CA/2012 Field Poll Sept. 6-18, '12 902 45 39 16 3 
39/CA/2012 USC Dornsife / LA Times Sept. 17-23, '12 1504 51 29 20 1 
39/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable  Oct. 7-10, '12 830 60.6 25.1 14.3 1 
39/CA/2012 CA Business Roundtable Oct. 21-28, '12 2115 54.5 28.5 17 1 
80/OR/2012 Survey USA Sept. 10-13, '12 700 37 41 22 3 
80/OR/2012 Survey USA Oct. 16-18, '12 700 36 43 21 3 
80/OR/2012 Elway Oct. 25-28,'12 405 42 49 9 4 
82/OR/2012 Survey USA Sept. 10-13, '12 700 27 43 31 5 
82/OR/2012 Survey USA Oct. 16-18, '12 700 28 53 19 5 
82/OR/2012 
Elway Research for The 
Oregonian Oct. 25-28,'12 405 28 66 6 5 
83/OR/2012 Survey USA Sept. 10-13, '12 700 28 39 33 4 
83/OR/2012 Survey USA Oct. 16-18, '12 700 26 54 20 5 
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Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing (continued) 
 
INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
83/OR/2012 Elway  Oct. 25-28,'12 405 26 66 8 5 
85/OR/2012 Survey USA Sept. 10-13, '12 700 14 21 65 3 
85/OR/2012 Survey USA Oct. 16-18, '12 700 53 26 21 1 
85/OR/2012 Elway  Oct. 25-28,'12 405 52 33 14 1 
502/WA/2012 Elway Research July '11 408 54 43 3 1 
502/WA/2012 Elway Research Jan. '12 411 48 45 7 3 
502/WA/2012 Survey USA July 16-17, '12 630 55 32 13 1 
502/WA/2012 PPP Nov. 1-3, '12 932 53 44 3 1 
19/CA/2010 Survey USA April 20, '10 500 56 42 3 1 
19/CA/2010 PPIC May 9-16, '10 2003 49 48 3 3 
19/CA/2010 Field Poll 6/22-7/5, '10 1005 44 48 8 3 
19/CA/2010 PPP July 23-25, '10 614 52 36 12 1 
19/CA/2010 Survey USA July 8-11, '10 614 50 40 11 1 
19/CA/2010 Survey USA 8/21-9/1, '10 569 47 43 10 3 
19/CA/2010 Field Poll Sept. 14-21, '10 599 49 42 9 2 
19/CA/2010 Survey USA Sept 19-21, '10 610 47 42 11 3 
19/CA/2010 PPIC Sept 19-26, '10 2004 52 41 7 1 
19/CA/2010 Reuters/Ipsos Oct. 2-4, '10 448 43 53 3 5 
19/CA/2010 PPIC Oct. 10-17, '10 2002 44 49 7 3 
19/CA/2010 
GQR for USC Dornsife 
and LA Times Oct. 13-20, '10 922 39 51 10 5 
19/CA/2010 Field for Sac. Bee Oct. 14-26, '10 1501 42 49 9 3 
23/CA/2010 Field Poll 6/22-7/5, '10 1005 36 48 16 4 
23/CA/2010 GQR for AV Sept. 15-22, '10 1511 40 38 22 3 
23/CA/2010 Field Poll Sept. 14-21, '10 599 34 45 11 4 
23/CA/2010 PPIC Sept. 19-26, '10 2004 43 42 15 3 
23/CA/2010 Reuters/Ipsos Oct. 2-4, '10 600 37 49 14 4 
23/CA/2010 PPIC Oct. 10-17, '10 2002 37 48 15 4 
23/CA/2010 Field for Sac. Bee Oct. 14-26, '10 1501 33 48 19 5 
24/CA/2010 PPIP Sept. 19-26, '10 2004 35 35 30 3 
24/CA/2010 PPIP Oct. 10-17, '10 2002 31 38 31 3 
25/CA/2010 Field Poll 6/22-7/5, '10 1005 65 20 15 1 
25/CA/2010 Field Poll Sept. 14-21, '10 599 46 30 24 1 
25/CA/2010 PPIC Sept. 19-26, '10 2004 48 35 17 2 
25/CA/2010 Reuters/Ipsos Oct. 2-4, '10 600 58 29 13 1 
25/CA/2010 PPIC Oct. 10-17, '10 2002 49 34 17 1 
25/CA/2010 Field for Sac. Bee Oct. 14-26, '10 1501 48 31 21 1 
73/OR/2010 Grove Insight  Aug. 18-21, '10 600 62 21 16 1 
 
 
 
  
130 
  
 
Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing (continued) 
 
INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
73/OR/2010 Elway  Oct. 18-19, '10 500 60 / / 1 
74/OR/2010 Grove Insight  Aug. 18-21, '10 600 41 46 13 3 
74/OR/2010 Elway  Oct. 18-19, '10 500 40 / / 5 
75/OR/2010 Grove Insight  Aug. 18-21, '10 600 35 51 14 5 
75/OR/2010 Elway Research  Oct. 18-19, '10 500 33 54 13 5 
76/OR/2010 
Elway Research for 
The Oregonian Oct. 18-19, '10 500 60 23 17 1 
1053/WA/2010 Washington Poll May 23-30, '10 1252 60 24 16 1 
1053/WA/2010 Survey USA Aug. 26-29, '10 650 55 18 26 1 
1053/WA/2010 Survey USA 9/30-10/3, '10 639 56 19 25 1 
1053/WA/2010 Elway Research Oct. 7-10, '10 400 49 34 17 1 
1053/WA/2010 Elway Research Sept. 9-12, '10 500 48 27 25 1 
1082/WA/2010 Survey USA Sept. 9-12, '10 500 31 31 38 3 
1082/WA/2010 Elway Research Oct. 7-10, '10 400 31 40 29 3 
1098/WA/2010 Survey USA April 21, '10 500 66 27 6 1 
1098/WA/2010 Washington Poll May 3-23, '10 1252 58 30 10 1 
1098/WA/2010 Elway Research June 9-13, '10 405 46 46 8 3 
1098/WA/2010 PPP 7/27-8/1, '10 1204 41 41 18 3 
1098/WA/2010 Survey USA Aug. 26-29, '10 650 41 33 26 3 
1098/WA/2010 Elway Research Sept. 9-12, '10 500 44 42 14 3 
1098/WA/2010 Survey USA 9/30-10/3, '10 639 41 39 20 3 
1098/WA/2010 Elway Oct. 7-10, '10 400 41 48 11 3 
1098/WA/2010 Washington Poll 10/5-14 + 18-28 695 43 54 3 5 
1098/WA/2010 Survey USA Oct. 24-27, '10 504 34 56 10 5 
1100/WA/2010 Washington Poll May 3-23, '10 1252 52 37 8 1 
1100/WA/2010 Elway Research Sept. 9-12, '10 500 45 34 21 2 
1100/WA/2010 Elway Research Oct. 7-10, '10 400 42 44 14 3 
1100/WA/2010 Washington Poll Oct. 4-14, '10 500 47 49 1 3 
1100/WA/2010 Survey USA Oct. 24-27, '10 504 48 40 12 3 
1105/WA/2010 Elway Research Sept. 9-12, '10 500 41 33 26 3 
1105/WA/2010 Elway Research Oct. 7-10, '10 400 36 45 18 3 
1107/WA/2010 Survey USA Aug. 26-29, '10 650 42 34 24 3 
1107/WA/2010 Elway Research Sept. 9-12, '10 500 47 38 15 3 
1107/WA/2010 Survey USA 9/30-10/3, '10 639 52 29 19 1 
1107/WA/2010 Elway Research Oct. 7-10, '10 400 54 33 13 1 
1107/WA/2010 Washington Poll Oct. 4-14, '10 500 56 36 7 1 
1107/WA/2010 Survey USA Oct. 24-27, '10 504 56 36 9 1 
2/CA/2008 Field Poll July 22, '08 / 63 24 13 1 
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Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing (continued) 
INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
2/CA/2008 Field Poll Oct. 18-28, '08 966 60 27 13 1 
3/CA/2008 Field Poll Sept. '08 / 47 35 18 2 
4/CA/2008 Field Poll July 22, '08 / 48 39 13 3 
4/CA/2008 PPIC Aug. 8, '08 2004 47 44 9 3 
4/CA/2008 PPIC Sept. 8, '08 2004 48 45 7 3 
4/CA/2008 PPIC Oct. 8, '08 2004 45 45 10 3 
4/CA/2008 Survey USA Oct. 15-16, '08 800 43 35 22 3 
4/CA/2008 PPIC Oct. 12-19, '08 / 46 44 10 3 
7/CA/2008 Field Poll July 22, '08 / 63 24 13 1 
7/CA/2008 Field Poll Oct. 18-28, '08 966 39 43 18 3 
8/CA/2008 PPIC Aug. 8, '08 2004 40 52 8 5 
8/CA/2008 PPIC Sept. 8, '08 2004 41 51 8 5 
8/CA/2008 PPIC Oct. 8, '08 2004 44 48 12 3 
8/CA/2008 Field Poll Oct. 18-28, '08 966 44 49 7 3 
10/CA/2008 Field Poll Oct. '08 / 49 39 12 2 
11/CA/2008 Field Poll July 22, '08 / 42 30 28 2 
11/CA/2008 Field Poll Oct. 18-28, '08 966 45 30 25 1 
985/WA/2008 Survey USA Sept. 5-7, '08 900 16 14 70 3 
985/WA/2008 Survey USA Sept. 21-22, '08 900 20 13 67 3 
985/WA/2008 Washington Poll Oct. '08 / 45 43 12 3 
985/WA/2008 Survey USA 10/30-11/2, '08 800 33 45 23 4 
1000/WA/2008 Survey USA Sept. 5-7, '08 900 52 25 23 1 
1000/WA/2008 Survey USA Sept. 21-22, '08 900 54 26 20 1 
1000/WA/2008 Survey USA Oct. 12-13, '08 1000 49 32 19 1 
1000/WA/2008 Survey USA 10/30-11/2, '08 800 55 40 5 1 
1029/WA/2008 Washington Poll Oct. '08 / 65 20 15 1 
85/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Oct. '06 / 46 43 11 3 
85/CA/2006 Field Poll July '06 / 44 45 11 3 
86/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Oct. '06 / 45 45 10 3 
86/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Sept. '06 / 53 40 7 1 
86/CA/2006 Field Poll July '06 / 63 32 5 1 
87/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Oct. '06 / 40 44 16 3 
87/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Sept. '06 / 44 41 15 3 
87/CA/2006 Field Poll July '06 / 52 31 17 1 
90/CA/2006 Field Poll Late Oct. '06 / 35 42 23 3 
90/CA/2006 Field Poll July '06 / 46 31 23 1 
61/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Oct. '04 / 54 29 17 1 
61/CA/2004 Field Poll Sept. '04 / 47 31 22 1 
61/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Sept. '04 / 46 35 19 2 
62/CA/2004 Field Poll May'04 / 50 37 13 1 
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Table A.1: Raw opinion poll data with competitive dynamic typing (continued)         
INITIATIVE SURVEY DATES SAMPLE YES  NO DON'T  TYPE 
      SIZE % % 
KNOW 
%   
62/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Oct. '04 / 40 38 22 3 
64/CA/2004 Field Poll Aug. '04 / 21 41 38 5 
64/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Sept. '04 / 26 38 36 4 
64/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Oct. '04 / 32 37 31 3 
66/CA/2004 Field Poll May '04 / 76 14 10 1 
66/CA/2004 Field Poll Aug. '04 / 69 19 12 1 
66/CA/2004 Field Poll Early Oct. '04 / 65 18 17 1 
66/CA/2004 Field Poll Oct. 21-24, '04 / 58 34 8 1 
66/CA/2004 Field Poll Oct. 25-27, '04 / 46 47 7 3 
67/CA/2004 Field Poll Aug. '04 / 37 47 16 4 
67/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Sept. '04 / 37 46 17 3 
67/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Oct. '04 / 37 50 13 5 
71/CA/2004 Field Poll July '04 / 45 42 13 3 
71/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Sept. '04 / 46 39 15 3 
71/CA/2004 Field Poll Late Oct. '04 / 54 37 9 1 
62/CA/2004 Field Poll Aug. '04 / 44 31 25 2 
62/CA/2004 Field Poll Early Oct. '04 / 44 31 25 2 
 
 
 
 
 Below, in Table A.2, the initiative contests in the sample are shown alongside 
their median polling type, Yes and No spending strength and aggregate spending (in 
thousands of dollars), and Yes vote share values. 
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INITIATIVE MEDIAN  YES SPENDING NO SPENDING YES  NO 
YES 
VOTE 
  POLL ($ thousands) ($ thousands) SPENDING SPENDING % 
  TYPE     STRENGTH STRENGTH   
30/CA/2012 1 53561 49280 3.27 2.94 55.4 
31/CA/2012 4 5868 331 0.36 0.02 39.5 
32/CA/2012 3 3 45568 72121 2.78 43.4 
33/CA/2012 4 14900 269 0.91 0.01 45 
34/CA/2012 3 393 6934 0.02 0.41 48 
35/CA/2012 1 2969 0 0.18 0 81.3 
36/CA/2012 1 2397 120 0.15 0 69.3 
37/CA/2012 3 9477 44109 0.58 2.63 48.6 
38/CA/2012 3 14558 40 0.89 0 28.7 
39/CA/2012 1 32126 44 1.96 0 61.1 
80/OR/2012 3 50 4 0 0.4 46.6 
82/OR/2012 5 2878 1354 2.91 2.43 28.3 
83/OR/2012 5 2878 1354 2.91 2.43 29.2 
85/OR/2012 1 1235 70 0.15 1.05 59.9 
502/WA/2012 1 6171 16 1.24 0.01 55.7 
19/CA/2010 3 3398 423 0.21 0.03 46.5 
23/CA/2010 4 10467 35251 0.63 2.1 38.4 
24/CA/2010 3 14583 15488 0.89 0.92 41.9 
25/CA/2010 1 17908 9635 1.09 0.57 55.1 
73/OR/2010 1 7 368 0.79 0 56.9 
74/OR/2010 4 144 3 0 0.12 44.2 
75/OR/2010 5 674 564 1.21 0.57 31.8 
76/OR/2010 1 1581 3 0 1.34 69.2 
1053/WA/2010 1 1505 1639 0.3 0.64 63.8 
1082/WA/2010 3 3431 6019 0.69 2.37 40.9 
1098/WA/2010 3 6423 6370 1.29 2.47 35.9 
1100/WA/2010 3 6063 9170 1.22 3.56 46.6 
1105/WA/2010 3 2744 0 0.55 0 35 
1107/WA/2010 1 16043 427 3.22 0.17 39.6 
 
Table A.2: Initiative contest Yes and No campaign spending strength and vote 
share 
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Table A.2: Initiative contest Yes and No campaign spending strength and vote 
share (continued) 
INITIATIVE MEDIAN  YES SPENDING NO SPENDING YES  NO 
YES 
VOTE 
  POLL ($ thousands) ($ thousands) SPENDING SPENDING % 
  TYPE     STRENGTH STRENGTH   
2/CA/2008 1 10314 8796 0.63 0.52 63.5 
3/CA/2008 2 6893 0 0.42 0 55.4 
4/CA/2008 3 2527 10325 0.15 0.62 48 
7/CA/2008 2 29787 9286 1.82 0.55 35.5 
8/CA/2008 4 41707 63494 2.55 3.79 52.2 
10/CA/2008 2 22859 182 1.4 0.01 40.5 
11/CA/2008 2 16742 1632 1.02 0.1 50.9 
985/WA/2008 3 899 249 0.15 0.1 40 
1000/WA/2008 1 5538 1695 1.11 0.66 57.8 
1029/WA/2008 1 995 178 0.2 0.07 72.5 
85/CA/2006 3 3797 6896 0.23 0.41 45.8 
86/CA/2006 1 16446 66340 1.01 3.96 48.3 
87/CA/2006 3 61342 92948 3.75 5.54 45.5 
90/CA/2006 2 4029 14345 0.25 0.86 47.6 
61/CA/2004 1 4521 0 0.27 0 41.7 
62/CA/2004 2 2464 499 0.15 0.03 46.1 
64/CA/2004 4 19479 3129 1.19 0.19 59 
66/CA/2004 1 5037 71 0.28 0.3 47.3 
67/CA/2004 4 6144 7288 0.38 0.37 28.4 
71/CA/2004 3 25000 400 1.53 0.02 59.1 
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– Appendix B – 
Design #2 Data 
 
 
 
Below, Table B.1 displays the data collected under Design # 2 for the state of 
California. So that the Wilson typing can be evaluated by the reader, a brief description 
of the initiative’s substance is provided. Also presented alongside each initiative contest 
is Yes and No spending in thousands of dollars and Yes vote share. Following Table B.1, 
the same sort of display is presented of the data for California initiatives in Table B.2. 
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Table B.1: Initiative substance, Yes and No spending strength, and Yes voting 
percentage of 31 California initiative contests from 2012 – 2000 
 
INITIATIVE WILSON INITIATIVE YES  NO YES VOTE 
  TYPE SUBSTANCE SPEND SPEND % 
30/CA/2012 2 
Jerry Brown's tax increase for general fund and 
edu. 53561 49280 55.4 
31/CA/2012 4 Two-year budget cycle 5868 331 39.5 
32/CA/2012 4 
Ban on corporate/union contributions to 
candidates 3 45568 43.4 
33/CA/2012 1 Car insurance regulatory changes 14900 269 45 
34/CA/2012 4 Ends the death penalty 393 6934 48 
35/CA/2012 4 
Increases penalties for human trafficking/ sex 
slavery 2969 0 81.3 
36/CA/2012 4 Softens"Three Strikes" law 2397 120 69.3 
37/CA/2012 2 Mandatory labelling of GMOs 9477 44109 48.6 
38/CA/2012 3 Molly Munger's state income tax increase for edu. 14558 40 28.7 
39/CA/2012 2 Income tax increase for multistate businesses 32126 44 61.1 
19/CA/2010 4 Legalizes and taxes marijuana 3398 423 55.7 
23/CA/2010 3 Suspends the "Global Warming Solutions Act" 10467 35251 46.5 
24/CA/2010 2 Eliminates three business tax breaks 14583 15488 38.4 
25/CA/2010 4 Budget can be passed by simple majority 17908 9635 41.9 
2/CA/2008 3 Regulations on animal confinement practices 10314 8796 63.5 
3/CA/2008 4 $980 million in bonds for children's hospitals 6893 0 55.4 
4/CA/2008 4 Abortion waiting period + minor parent notify 2527 10325 48 
7/CA/2008 4 Promotes use of alternative fules 29787 9286 35.5 
8/CA/2008 4 Bans same-sex marriages 41707 63494 52.2 
10/CA/2008 2 $5 billion in bonds for renewable fuels 22859 182 40.5 
11/CA/2008 4 
Independent commission to handle leg. 
redistricting 16742 1632 50.9 
85/CA/2006 4 
Require parental notification of a minor's 
abortion 3797 6896 50.9 
86/CA/2006 2 Tax on cigarettes 16446 66340 48.3 
87/CA/2006 2 New tax on gas, oil 61342 92948 45.5 
90/CA/2006 3 
Limits state's eminent domain proprty-taking   
abilites 4029 14345 47.6 
61/CA/2004 4 
$750 million in bonds for children's hospital 
projects 4521 0 41.7 
62/CA/2004 4 Elections, primaries 2464 499 46.1 
64/CA/2004 2 
Limits on  enforcement of unfair business 
competition  19479 3129 59 
66/CA/2004 4 "Three strikes" laws and sex crimes 5037 71 47.3 
67/CA/2004 3 Funds emergency medical services with tax hikes 6144 7288 28.4 
71/CA/2004 2 Spend $2 billion on stem cell research 25000 400 59.1 
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INITIATIVE WILSON INITIATIVE YES  NO 
YES 
VOTE 
  TYPE SUBSTANCE SPEND SPEND % 
79/OR/2012 3 bans real estate taxes 5069.1 614.2 58.9 
80/OR/2012 4 legalize and regulate marijuana 50.7 4.6 46.6 
81/OR/2012 1 ban gill net salmon fishing 181.1 839.1 34.5 
82/OR/2012 3 authorizes private casinos 2878.3 1354.4 28.3 
83/OR/2012 3 
authorizes construction of Grange 
casino 2878.3 1354.4 29.2 
84/OR/2012 3 phases out estate tax 129.4 619.9 45.9 
85/OR/2012 2 creates corporate  tax to fund K-12 1235 70 59.9 
73/OR/2010 4 increases minimum sentences 7.5 368.2 56.9 
74/OR/2010 4 medical marijuana licenses  144.4 3.4 44.2 
75/OR/2010 2 25% gaming tax, funds police, edu. 674.7 564.3 31.8 
76/OR/2010 4 
% lottery proceeds goes to 
conservation 1581.6 3.4 69.2 
58/OR/2008 4 requires immersion for ESL students 180.7 1252.4 43.7 
59/OR/2008 3 
fed. Income tax deductible on OR 
returns 157.9 1293.7 36.2 
60/OR/2008 4 
teacher pay based on student test 
results 157.9 1258.5 38.6 
61/OR/2008 4 establishes mandatory sentences 572.2 1185.8 48.9 
62/OR/2008 4 % lottery proceeds goest to police 344.1 1233.7 39.4 
63/OR/2008 3 
less permits for property 
improvements 54.3 1708.3 45.8 
64/OR/2008 1 
no taxpayer funded collection of pol. 
funds 147.3 2394.8 49.4 
65/OR/2008 4 changes nomination process 748 401.3 34.1 
33/OR/2004 4 allows for use of medical marijuana 530.9 0 42.8 
34/OR/2004 2 increases state forest conservation 1610.6 2825 29.1 
35/OR/2004 1 limits medical lawsuit liability 11311.6 2692.2 49.2 
36/OR/2004 4 same-sex marriage ban 2250.1 2954.1 56.6 
37/OR/2004 4 
restricts  regulatory taking (see 
2000's Measure 7) 1084.6 2734.1 60.6 
38/OR/2004 1 
abolishes State Accident Insurance 
Fund 5608.3 4618 39.3 
21/OR/2002 4 
"none of the above" judicial election 
option 816.3 141.5 44.1 
 
Table B.2: Initiative substance, Yes and No spending strength, and Yes voting 
percentage of 49 Oregon initiative contests from 2012 – 2000  
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Table B.2: Initiative substance, Yes and No spending strength, and Yes voting 
percentage of 49 Oregon initiative contests from 2012 – 2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
INITIATIVE WILSON INITIATIVE YES  NO YES VOTE 
  TYPE SUBSTANCE SPEND SPEND % 
22/OR/2002 4 divides state into 7 electoral districts 653.2 136.2 49.4 
23/OR/2002 2 
creates universal state healthcare 
program 103.5 1305.6 21.5 
24/OR/2002 3 
allows denturists to install partial 
dentures 40.5 0 76 
25/OR/2002 4 increases minimum wage 578.3 546.8 51.3 
26/OR/2002 4 
no paying petition circulators per 
signature 1144.8 0 75.4 
27/OR/2002 2 requires GMO labels on food 1718.2 5396.6 29.5 
91/OR/2000 3 
fed. income tax deductible on OR 
returns 246.1 1084 44.8 
92/OR/2000 1 
no payroll deductions for political 
purposes 2.9 2733.6 44.6 
93/OR/2000 4 
raising taxes, fees requires voter 
approval 48.9 995.9 40.2 
94/OR/2000 4 repeals mandatory minimum sentences 163 170.7 26.5 
95/OR/2000 2 
teacher pay based on student 
performance 567.8 1309.4 34.9 
96/OR/2000 4 
only direct leg. can regulate initiative 
process 2.2 34.2 37.8 
97/OR/2000 2 
bans certain ways of trapping, killing 
animals 735.4 796.8 41.2 
98/OR/2000 1 
no using public resources for political 
causes 3.2 2743.1 46.6 
99/OR/2000 4 
monitors public funded homecare for 
elderly 142.7 1.4 62.8 
1/OR/2000 4 leg. must fully fund school quality goals  33.7 1.4 66.3 
2/OR/2000 4 process for leg. to review admin. rules 450.9 960 43.7 
3/OR/2000 4 conviction required before forfeiture 448.4 5.7 67.2 
4/OR/2000 4 
tobacco-settlement $ goes to 
healthcare 454.6 156.6 45.2 
5/OR/2000 4 
background check before buying 
firearm 2028.7 928.6 61.8 
6/OR/2000 4 public funding for certain candidates 879.9 287 41.2 
7/OR/2000 4 
gov't pays owner if regulation lowers 
prop. value 368.5 937.9 53 
8/OR/2000 4 
limits state spending to fixed 
percentage 387.5 995.1 43.5 
9/OR/2000 4 
public schools cannot encourage 
homosexuality 238.3 1472.5 47.1 
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– Appendix C – 
Design #3 Data 
 
 
 
 On the following page, in Table C.1, the county-level data from Design #3 is 
displayed. Each county is presented in a separate row alongside its level of Democratic 
Party attachment. Columns are presented for each initiative number, state, and year. Then 
rows show each counties’ percentage of Yes vote for a given initiative.   
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COUNTY DEMOCRATIC  
36/OR/20
04 
37/OR/
2004 
35/OR/
2004 
14/OR/
2004 
43/OR/
2006 
  AFFILIATION           
BAKER 29 61.3 50.7 44.9 32.6 42.7 
BENTON 58 36.6 38.5 25.4 69 52.1 
CLACKAMAS 48.8 49.2 51.7 35.6 64.1 46.8 
CLATSOP 54.2 44.4 41.3 35 60.6 62.6 
COLUMBIA 50.4 53.8 47.8 38.4 49.8 57.5 
COOS 43.1 54.3 48.4 41.2 45.1 52.1 
CROOK 30.1 65.1 51 46.5 42.2 52 
CURRY  40.8 58 47.9 45.3 46.2 53.6 
DESCHUTES 42.1 52.4 48.5 40.1 58.4 49.1 
DOUGLAS 32.5 63.9 50.5 43.7 39.9 41.1 
GILLIAM  32.5 52.6 44.3 36.7 45.9 5O.7 
GRANT 19.2 64.7 53.6 43.9 22.8 49.2 
HARNEY 22.7 65.3 49.2 46.2 31 44.7 
HOOD RIVER 56.7 46.4 46.5 36.4 61.5 52.8 
JACKSON 43.4 52.4 52.5 35.5 58.2 54.7 
JEFFERSON 40 55.9 48.7 41.9 51.6 50.4 
JOSEPHINE 36 62.1 49.9 43.4 49.6 46.2 
KLAMATH 26.2 62.7 48.9 46 39.6 39 
LAKE 20.5 66.6 51.9 45.7 29.9 41.1 
LANE 58 42.4 40.8 31 65.5 53.2 
LINCOLN 56.5 42.9 43.2 39.1 62.6 60.4 
LINN 38.3 59 50.3 38.8 47.4 46.5 
MALHEUR 23.8 67.7 59.2 50.2 31.4 39.4 
MARION 44.5 51.8 51 34.3 62.5 44.2 
MORROW 32.8 58.2 46.5 42.4 39.3 54.2 
MULTNOMAH 71.6 32.8 41.6 28.5 75.5 62.3 
POLK  43.6 52.2 51.7 31.5 59.9 42.9 
SHERMAN 35.3 53.5 49.7 43.2 40.8 45.2 
TILLAMOOK 48.4 49.6 45.3 39.1 56.9 53.9 
UMATILLA 33.8 58.6 44.8 39.6 44.9 50.1 
UNION 32.8 55.5 46.8 38 39.7 49.7 
WALLOWA 28.1 61.9 51.9 46.5 29.2 48.5 
WASCO 47.4 51.3 49.4 37.8 55.2 54.2 
WASHINGTON 52.4 44 50.9 34.1 69.1 46.9 
WHEELER 27.8 64.7 46.3 42.5 30.7 49.9 
YAMHILL 40 53.9 52.3 38.4 55.9 46.3 
 
Figure C.1: County-level Yes  voting percentage on initiative and county-level 
Democratic Party attachmen 
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Figure C.1: County-level Yes  voting percentage on initiative and county-level 
Democratic Party affiliation (continued) 
 
 
COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY 36/OR/2004 37/OR/2004 
35/OR/20
04 
14/OR/2
004 
43/OR/2
006 
  AFFILIATION           
BAKER 29 73.4 71.7 54.6 60.9 56.8 
BENTON 58 45.2 48.7 49.7 78.9 36.6 
CLACKAMAS 48.8 60.3 63.8 50.4 71.8 46.8 
CLATSOP 54.2 55.3 62.1 50.2 68 40.6 
COLUMBIA 50.4 65 69.2 44.3 62.2 48.5 
COOS 43.1 65.6 72.3 54.9 59.4 51.5 
CROOK 30.1 76.1 69.7 53.2 57 58.7 
CURRY  40.8 64.8 67.9 50.8 63.4 49.5 
DESCHUTES 42.1 61.2 63.3 54.3 69.3 51 
DOUGLAS 32.5 73.1 73.1 60.1 62.3 58 
GILLIAM  32.5 68.8 60.6 52.6 59.4 46.1 
GRANT 19.2 74.7 70.6 58.4 57.5 58.2 
HARNEY 22.7 75.2 72.8 55.5 53.3 60.9 
HOOD RIVER 56.7 52.6 53.3 46.8 71.9 37.4 
JACKSON 43.4 61.7 62 56.1 72.5 52 
JEFFERSON 40 70.9 64.9 52.3 62 53.2 
JOSEPHINE 36 69.1 71.2 54 65.5 57.5 
KLAMATH 26.2 76.1 74.8 62 57.8 62 
LAKE 20.5 78.2 74.3 58.6 60.9 62.1 
LANE 58 50 55.9 47.7 77.2 39.8 
LINCOLN 56.5 52.4 57.7 45.6 66.8 38.9 
LINN 38.3 70.7 68 53.4 64.6 58.4 
MALHEUR 23.8 76.7 74.8 59 59.1 69.3 
MARION 44.5 64.2 61.8 55.9 65.4 53.7 
MORROW 32.8 72.9 72.6 56.9 58.3 56.9 
MULTNOMAH 71.6 40.3 51.5 37.3 77.2 29.5 
POLK  43.6 63.5 60.2 57 71.3 53.7 
SHERMAN 35.3 69.3 66.2 54 62.7 51.7 
TILLAMOOK 48.4 61.2 57.7 47.5 66 43.8 
UMATILLA 33.8 72.1 68.9 59.4 60.7 60.1 
UNION 32.8 68.7 65.1 54.4 63.8 52.8 
WALLOWA 28.1 68.7 63.5 62.7 63.7 55.5 
WASCO 47.4 65.2 63.6 50.3 67.1 49.3 
WASHINGTON 52.4 54.4 60.6 47.7 76.5 44.3 
WHEELER 27.8 75.6 66.7 52.1 60.4 52.3 
YAMHILL 40 66 64.5 56 64.4 52.4 
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Figure C.1: County-level Yes  voting percentage on initiative and county-level 
Democratic Party affiliation (continued) 
 
 
COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY 40/OR/2006 48/OR/2006 42/OR/2006 47/OR/2006 
  AFFILIATION         
BAKER 29 59.6 31.4 35.1 57.7 
BENTON 58 35.1 21.8 28.7 41.6 
CLACKAMAS 48.8 43.1 33.3 35 53.2 
CLATSOP 54.2 42 27.8 34.2 52.6 
COLUMBIA 50.4 51.6 32.9 38.8 57.9 
COOS 43.1 53.7 30.9 34.5 53.9 
CROOK 30.1 59.2 37.1 36.8 61.3 
CURRY  40.8 53.4 29.9 36.2 59.8 
DESCHUTES 42.1 47.8 29.5 32.4 55.4 
DOUGLAS 32.5 57.9 35.3 37.6 55.9 
GILLIAM  32.5 59.8 23.3 43.6 54.6 
GRANT 19.2 63.5 32.9 37.9 57.5 
HARNEY 22.7 64.3 34.7 43.8 57.2 
HOOD RIVER 56.7 44.5 26.3 35 54.6 
JACKSON 43.4 49.6 29.9 31.9 53.9 
JEFFERSON 40 53.8 32 35.1 57.9 
JOSEPHINE 36 56.9 32.4 34.6 58.2 
KLAMATH 26.2 67.5 37.5 40.9 59 
LAKE 20.5 68.6 33.3 41.9 56.9 
LANE 58 38 23.9 34.8 51.2 
LINCOLN 56.5 45.7 28.8 38.4 59.8 
LINN 38.3 53.9 34.9 37.1 55.9 
MALHEUR 23.8 66 33.7 42 55.6 
MARION 44.5 46.2 33.5 34.4 53.5 
MORROW 32.8 62.8 30.7 41.5 59.2 
MULTNOMAH 71.6 30 22.9 37.3 50 
POLK  43.6 47.6 32.8 31.9 54.1 
SHERMAN 35.3 66 32.5 43.7 61.2 
TILLAMOOK 48.4 49.1 29.7 38.9 57.3 
UMATILLA 33.8 58.4 31.1 42.5 56.6 
UNION 32.8 57.1 27 30.4 54 
WALLOWA 28.1 59.8 30.7 34.8 52.7 
WASCO 47.4 54.8 29.9 39.8 58.4 
WASHINGTON 52.4 38.9 30 34.4 52.2 
WHEELER 27.8 63.2 28.6 41.2 56.6 
YAMHILL 40 48.3 33.8 35.4 54.5 
 
 
 
